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SCRUTINIZING POLYGAMY: UTAH’S BROWN V. BUHMAN
AND BRITISH COLUMBIA’S REFERENCE RE: SECTION 293
Maura I. Strassberg∗
ABSTRACT
In Brown v. Buhman, the recent challenge to the Utah law criminalizing
polygamy brought by the stars of the reality television show Sister Wives, a
federal district court determined both that strict scrutiny was required and that
strict scrutiny could not be satisfied. A significant factor in this result was the
state’s failure to mount a strong defense of the law, assuming that it could rely
on long standing polygamy precedents such as the United States Supreme
Court decision in Reynolds v. United States and more recent Tenth Circuit and
Utah Supreme Court decisions to justify limiting scrutiny to rational basis and
to provide legitimate reasons for the criminalization of polygamy. However,
the State could have taken advantage of a then just released Canadian opinion,
Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada (Reference), to
explain the real and expansive harms of polygamy. The Reference court
undertook an exhaustive examination of the impact of polygamy on women, on
children, on men, and on society, utilizing empirical evidence, expert reports,
personal anecdotes, and a wide range of “Brandeis Brief” materials. This
Article argues that the broad range of social and individual harms of
polygamy identified in Reference provide a compelling state interest sufficient
to withstand the strict scrutiny deemed necessary by Brown.
The Article also argues that the Utah statute cannot properly be
understood to be a “religious gerrymander” requiring strict scrutiny. The
Brown court’s determination that the Utah statute only targeted religiously
motivated polygamy was based on its improper segregation of the statute’s
coverage of licensed bigamy and polygamy, which the court acknowledged
covered both religiously and nonreligiously motivated marriages, from the
statute’s coverage of unlicensed ceremonial polygamous marriages and
∗ Professor of Law, Drake University Law School, maura.strassberg@drake.edu; B.A. Swarthmore
College, 1977; M.A. Boston University, 1981; J.D. Columbia University Law School, 1984. I would like to
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polygamous marital cohabitation, which the court saw as only religiously
motivated. The Article goes on to show that the real target of the Utah statute
are the multiple marital relationships present in all polygamy and not the
religious motivation for polygamy undeniably present in much of the actual
Mormon Fundamentalist polygamy practiced in Utah. The Article additionally
argues that the heightened scrutiny called for by the Brown court under the
Smith hybrid analysis is also not justified.
Finally, the Article briefly considers how a statute that only criminalizes
religiously motivated polygamy might be justified, based on the way in which
polygamous religious communities funnel teenage girls into polygamous
marriages by ensuring that they never have the chance to develop sufficient
autonomy to truly choose for themselves, not unlike the way the Amish in
Yoder sought to limit their children’s education to prevent them from having
either the desire or ability to live anything but an agrarian life. This Article
suggests that confronting the autonomy-destroying impact of religiously
motivated practices, such as polygamy, might force reconsideration of both
Yoder and the limits of free exercise.
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INTRODUCTION
The constitutionality of criminalizing1 polygamy was once an easy decision
for the courts. In 1879, the United States Supreme Court confined its
substantive discussion of polygamy to two paragraphs in Reynolds v. United
States,2 and the Court has never seriously reconsidered the conclusions it
reached.3 However, modern readers of Reynolds find the Court’s conclusory
and vague claims about the negative effects of polygamy on social order and
political organization4 unconvincing and tainted by the Court’s disparaging
association of polygamy with “Asiatic and . . . African people.”5 As same-sex

1 This Article addresses only the issue of criminalizing the practice of polygamy, which would have to
be resolved in favor of decriminalization before the issue of legal recognition could be raised.
2 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
3 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535 (1993); Emp’t Div.
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
4 98 U.S. at 165–66 (“[A]ccording as monogamous or polygamous marriages are allowed, do we find
the principles on which the government of the people . . . rests. . . . [P]olygamy leads to the patriarchal
principle, and which, when applied to large communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism, while that
principle cannot long exist in connection with monogamy.”).
5 Id. at 164.
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relationships have become decriminalized6 and legally recognized,7 many have
also found it difficult to understand why and how polygamy could continue to
be criminalized. With the ground appearing to shift under what had previously
been unquestioned rejection of polygamy, two recent major court decisions
have tackled the issue head-on and have come out on opposite sides of the
question.
In Canada, the British Columbia Supreme Court, addressing a
constitutional reference to the court by the government of British Columbia,
upheld the continued criminalization of polygamy under the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms (Charter).8 The trial in Reference re: Section 293 of
the Criminal Code of Canada (Reference), under Canadian law,9 was able to
be brought in the absence of a “case or controversy.”10 It involved forty-two
days of hearings,11 ninety affidavits and expert reports,12 and “Brandeis Brief
materials . . . . compris[ing] several hundred legal and social science articles,
books and DVDs.”13 Under Canadian law, limits on a right protected by the
Charter must be justified by a purpose that is “pressing and substantial.”14 As
such, a large part of the decision in Reference was concerned with identifying
the harms of polygamy and determining whether they were pressing and
substantial.15 In 2011, the court issued a comprehensive 228-page opinion
setting out the psychological, sociological, and political impacts of polygamy,
finding that this was an objective that was pressing and substantial16 and

6

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).
E.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (requiring the federal government to
recognize same-sex marriages in certain states); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding
Virginia’s ban on same-sex marriages unconstitutional); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1229–30 (10th
Cir. 2014) (holding Utah’s ban on same-sex marriages unconstitutional).
8 Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588, paras. 15–16 (Can.)
[hereinafter Reference].
9 See Constitutional Question Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 68, s. 1 (Can.) (allowing the government to refer
constitutional questions to the courts).
10 U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2; see also Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824)
(“[W]hen the subject is submitted to it by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law . . . . [i]t
then becomes a case . . . .”).
11 Reference, 2011 BCSC 1588, at 2.
12 Id. para. 28.
13 Id. para. 32.
14 Id. paras. 1271–1273.
15 Id. para. 5 (“[T]his case is essentially about harm; more specifically, Parliament’s reasoned
apprehension of harm arising out of the practice of polygamy.”); id. paras. 1279–1282 (setting out the
positions of the parties regarding the pressing and substantial quality of the alleged harms).
16 Id. paras. 1331–1333.
7
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concluding that the law was consistent with the Charter, despite the way in
which it infringed upon liberty and freedom of religion.17
In the United States, in a case brought by the reality TV stars of Sister
Wives, Kody Brown and his four wives (Meri, Janelle, Christine, and Robyn)
and litigated by Professor Jonathan Turley of George Washington University
Law School, the United States District Court for the District of Utah found
Utah’s criminalization of polygamy unconstitutional.18 Brown v. Buhman was
decided on summary judgment based on twenty-two undisputed facts19 with
the State failing to submit any admissible evidence on the social harms of
polygamy and largely failing to substantively oppose the constitutional
claims.20 In its long and complex 2013 opinion in Brown, the Utah federal
court held that parts of Utah’s criminal bigamy statute21 failed to pass either
strict, heightened, or rational basis scrutiny.22 The court upheld the statute
insofar as it prohibited multiple legal marriages but struck down the statute’s
application to a practice of polygamy that involved multiple religious
marriages for which legal recognition was not sought.23
Although the focus of this Article is not on the comparative advantages or
disadvantages of a constitutional reference versus a case or controversy
approach, it is notable that the presence of an adversarial “case” in Brown
failed to produce the expected full exploration of the issues; it was not equally
litigated on both sides. In contrast, the law in Reference was both strongly
defended and attacked: the Attorneys General of British Columbia and Canada
took the position that the polygamy law was constitutional, an ‘Amicus’
appointed by the court opposed the law,24 and eleven groups were granted
Interested Person status,25 four of whom opposed the law and seven of whom
supported it.26 The impact of the incomplete litigation in Brown was
significant; the court failed to appreciate the extent of the harm sought to be

17

Id. para. 1359.
Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1190 (D. Utah 2013).
19 Id. at 1178–80.
20 Id. at 1176–77.
21 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (West 2004), invalidated in part by Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170. Utah
does not distinguish between bigamy and polygamy in its criminal code.
22 Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1221–23.
23 Id. at 1234.
24 Reference, 2011 BCSC 1588, para. 18 (Can.).
25 Id. para. 21. Interested Person status corresponds more closely to what would be termed an amicus in a
United States court.
26 Id. paras. 21–22.
18
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avoided by criminalizing polygamy. At the same time, this failure can also be
traced to the vague justifications given for criminalizing polygamy in cases
that preceded Brown, starting with Reynolds and ending more recently with
one Tenth Circuit and two Utah Supreme Court cases upholding Utah’s
polygamy law against constitutional attack: Potter v. Murray City27 in 1985,
State v. Green28 in 2004, and State v. Holm29 in 2006.
The failure to appreciate the harm of polygamy had an impact on all phases
and levels of the constitutional scrutiny in Brown. It allowed the court to claim
a crucial distinction between polygamy understood as multiple legally
recognized marriages and polygamy understood as multiple nonlegally
recognized marital relationships. As a result, the Brown court held that the
decision in Reynolds was controlling only as to legally recognized polygamy
because the facts of Reynolds did not involve multiple nonlegally recognized
marital relationships.30 Brown therefore upheld the Utah polygamy law insofar
as it prohibits multiple legal marriages without engaging in any scrutiny, even
as the court suggested that this prohibition too was unjustified.31 This then left
the court free to subject the law’s prohibition against entering into multiple
unrecognized marital relationships by itself to a rigorous, contemporary
constitutional analysis. However, it was exactly this isolation of non-legally
recognized polygamy from legally recognized polygamy that allowed the court
in Brown to justify strict scrutiny of the law as an impermissible “religious
gerrymander” under the free exercise analysis set out in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.32 Later in the opinion, the court’s isolation
of nonlegally recognized polygamy from legally recognized polygamy made it
possible to dismiss the most significant state interest in the prohibition of
polygamy, protecting monogamous marriage, as not even a rational basis,33 let
alone a compelling one,34 for criminalizing multiple legally unrecognized
marital relationships.

27 760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that a police officer’s termination of employment due to his
practice of polygamy did not violate his right to free exercise of religion).
28 99 P.3d 820 (Utah 2004).
29 137 P.3d 726 (Utah 2006).
30 Brown v. Buhman, 947 F.Supp. 2d 1170, 1190 (D. Utah 2013).
31 Id. at 1189 (“Reynolds is not, or should no longer be considered, good law . . . .”).
32 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (finding a law to be operationally non-neutral and not of general applicability
because the prohibition of animal slaughter contained so many exemptions that in the end it only targeted a
particular religion’s practice of animal sacrifice).
33 Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1222–25.
34 Id. at 1217–22.
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However, with the deeper understanding of the negative social and political
consequences of polygamy Reference provides, it becomes clear that tolerating
polygamous relationships is no less problematic than recognizing them as legal
marriages. Indeed, as has been the case with the move from decriminalizing
same-sex relationships to recognizing same-sex marriage, tolerance may well
be a step toward legal recognition. If Reynolds can be rehabilitated by this
modern understanding of the social and political impacts of polygamy versus
monogamy, then all three of the moves that allowed the Brown court to
conclude that parts of the Utah polygamy law were unconstitutional will be
foreclosed. Not only should the law not be subjected to strict scrutiny, but it
should survive even if it is so scrutinized.
This Article will begin by identifying the state interests articulated in
Reynolds, Potter, Green, and Holm and will explain why they are vulnerable to
varying levels of scrutiny, including the level applied in Brown. It will then
summarize the findings of the court in Reference that reveal more clearly the
harms of polygamy, as well as its inverse relationship to monogamy. This will
create a foundation for an analysis and critique of the reasoning in Brown, both
as to its findings that strict scrutiny was justified and its holding that there was
no state interest sufficient to justify the law’s application to legally
unrecognized polygamous marriages.
I. WHAT ARE THE HARMS OF POLYGAMY?
A. The Harms Identified in Reynolds, Potter, Green, and Holm
The Reynolds decision begins with a Glucksberg-like35 account of the
history of the social repudiation of polygamy. It is here that we find the
infamous statement, “Polygamy has always been odious among the northern
and western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon
Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African
people.”36 For the court in Brown, this statement cast everything the Reynolds
Court had to say about polygamy under the shadow of “Orientalism,”37 a term
coined by Professor Edward Said to describe “an ideology of racial
35

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (setting out an analytic method for
fundamental rights that first requires a historical review of whether the alleged right is “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history” (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)) (internal quotation mark
omitted)).
36 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879).
37 Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1182.
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inferiority . . . which . . . denigrates [Middle Eastern, African, and Asian
cultures] as socially and racially inferior”38 to the West. Consequently, the
court dismissed the social harm identified by the Reynolds Court as nothing
more than “introducing a practice perceived to be characteristic of
non-European people—or non-white races—into white American society.”39
Viewing Reynolds as finding polygamy harmful merely because it was a
non-Western practice40 undermined even what the Brown court saw as its most
limited holding, that prohibiting legal recognition of religiously motivated
polygamous marriage was constitutional.41 Nonetheless, Brown felt compelled
to follow Reynolds as to this form of polygamy because the Supreme Court has
continued to cite Reynolds approvingly, even as its free exercise jurisprudence
has evolved.42
If all the Supreme Court was saying in Reynolds was that polygamy is bad
because it is a practice of racially inferior others, then I would agree with
Brown that Reynolds should be tossed in the waste bin of history. However,
Reynolds makes more substantive arguments about the harms of polygamy.
The substantive points made by the Court are as follows: (1) polygamy is “an
offence against society,”43 (2) society is built upon marriage,44 (3) marriage
creates “social relations and social obligation and duties, with which
government is necessarily required to deal,”45 (4) the “principles on which the
government . . . rests” correlate with whether monogamy or polygamy is
allowed,46 (5) “polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle . . . which . . . fetters
the people in stationary despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in
connection with monogamy,”47 and (6) “an exceptional colony of polygamists
under an exceptional leadership may sometimes exist for a time without
appearing to disturb the social condition of the people who surround it.”48

38

Id. (citing EDWARD. W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 14–15, 92–110 (1979)).
Id. at 1188.
40 See also Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49
(1890) (expressing even more blatant Orientalist views toward polygamy by describing it as “a return to
barbarism” and “contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity has produced in
the Western world”).
41 Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1189.
42 Id.
43 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1879).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 165–66.
47 Id. at 166.
48 Id.
39
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Two distinct state interests can be identified here. First, propositions 1–3
and 6 address the effects of polygamy on “society.” The Court suggests that
marriage is a foundation of society; that it creates social relations, obligation,
and duties that the government must deal with; and that even allowing
polygamy to be practiced by a limited and isolated group within a
monogamous society will have a negative impact on society. Propositions 4
and 5 identify what may be a different harm of polygamy: despotic and
repressive government arises from polygamy while monogamy produces
democratic- and liberty-enhancing government.
1. Harm to Society
The problem with the claim that polygamy is harmful to society is that we
have no idea in what way this is the case. We can see that the obvious social
relations, obligations, and duties created by marriage are spousal, parental,
familial, and governmental. Furthermore, we can see that legislation will be
necessary to protect these relationships, to secure individual rights and welfare,
to maintain social harmony, and to enhance the potential contributions of
families to society and nation. Thus, laws covering marriage rights and
obligations, parental rights and obligation, inheritance laws, public support and
education, and a host of other topics are needed. Polygamy might create
different social relations, obligations, and duties that would require different
legislation to address. However, what is missing here is how allowing
polygamy to exist will “disturb the social condition” of the monogamous
society around it.49 Similar vague implications of harm to monogamous society
can be found in subsequent polygamy opinions. Potter states without further
explanation that “[m]onogamy is inextricably woven into the fabric of our
society. It is the bedrock upon which our culture is built.”50 Green briefly
mentions “the State’s interest in regulating marriage as an important social
unit”51 but provides no further explanation about why varying the form of the
social unit would implicate state interests. Holm says a bit more:
Our State’s commitment to monogamous unions is a recognition that
decisions made by individuals as to how to structure even the most
personal of relationships are capable of dramatically affecting public
life.

49
50
51

Id.
Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1985).
State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 830 (Utah 2004).
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....
Moreover, marital relationships serve as the building blocks of
our society. The State must be able to assert some level of control
over those relationships to ensure the smooth operation of laws and
further the proliferation of social unions our society deems beneficial
while discouraging those deemed harmful. The people of this State
have declared monogamy a beneficial marital form and have also
declared polygamous relationships harmful.52

Despite more words, Holm also does not explain how polygamy is harmful to
“public life” or society.
The district court in Potter did make one significant point that echoes the
Reynolds Court’s claim that a polygamous group within a monogamous society
would eventually negatively impact the monogamous society, an argument that
was also significant to the Reference court. In response to a claim that an
exemption from the law regarding polygamy only for those practicing religious
polygamy would have a minimal impact, the court reasoned that, given the
“increasingly broad scope” of religious belief, “[t]he gate would be open by the
developing trend of decision to everyone who might desire more than one wife
at a time on the basis of his own particular religious belief.”53 Here, the
negative impact is on monogamy itself. Given an opportunity, the district court
suggests that many men might choose polygamy over monogamy. However, in
the absence of a reason why the state has a strong interest in preserving
monogamy or why the choice of polygamy would lead to specific harmful
consequences, this possibility on its own fails to justify criminalizing
polygamy.
While a preference for monogamy over polygamy, due to its possible
relationship to liberty and democracy, might be sufficient to withstand the
most minimal rational basis review,54 this would not be the case if the more
rigorous rational basis review we have seen applied to prohibitions against
same-sex marriage were to be applied. In same-sex marriage cases, states were

52

State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 743–44 (Utah 2006).
Potter v. Murray City, 585 F. Supp. 1126, 1139 (D. Utah 1984); accord MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS.
THE GAVEL 60–62 (rev. 2d ed. 2014) (describing how religious exemptions for childhood vaccinations
“spur[ed] claims for nonreligious exemptions, and a breakdown in the purpose of the law in the first place”).
54 E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) (speculating about reasons
the legislature might have required a new prescription from an ophthalmologist or optometrist before an
optician could duplicate or replace eyeglass lenses and finding the possibility of such reasons sufficient to
address equal protection concerns).
53
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required to do more than claim that society would be harmed by same-sex
marriage. They had to identify specific harms and show a possible connection
between the prohibited practice and these harms.55 When they were unable to
explain how same-sex marriage would lead to harms, such as undermining
heterosexual marriage or harming children, legal prohibitions against same-sex
marriage were found to fail “rational” basis scrutiny.56 If criminal laws against
polygamy are evaluated under the more rigorous rational basis scrutiny seen in
sexual orientation cases such as Romer v. Evans,57 states will need to both be
more specific about the harms to society avoided and offer more support for
claims that these harms will actually arise.
2. Despotic Government
The second claim made by the Reynolds Court, that polygamy produces
despotic government, is more specific than the harm to society claim.
Furthermore, avoiding despotism would certainly seem to be an important, if
not compelling, state interest allowing prohibitions on polygamy to potentially
survive heightened or strict scrutiny. Indeed, it could be argued that this
interest was understood as so compelling and crucial that Congress felt it
necessary to clarify, in connection with the entrance of Utah, New Mexico, and
Arizona into the Union, that state power over marriage could never include the
power to allow polygamy.58 However, it is not obviously true that polygamy

55 E.g., De Leon v. Perry, 975. F. Supp. 2d 632, 652 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (finding the Texas ban on
same-sex marriage unconstitutional under rational basis review).
56 Id. at 652–54.
57 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (requiring the state to specify objectives for a Colorado constitutional
amendment that repealed and prohibited state and local laws barring discrimination based on sexual orientation
and finding that the specified objectives, freedom of association of landlords and employers and conservation
of resources to fight discrimination against other groups, were not credibly related to the much broader
amendment).
58 Congress made it a condition of the admission of the states of Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona to the
Union that polygamy be forever prohibited. State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 739 (Utah 2006); id. at 757
(Nehring, J., concurring). In Potter, the defendant argued that the bigamy law was forced upon the state
through the requirement that Utah’s constitution prohibit polygamy. Potter, 585 F. Supp. at 1136–37. The
defendant also argued that this violated the equal footing doctrine, requiring that “each state is ‘equal in power,
dignity, and authority,’ and that a state’s sovereign power may not be constitutionally diminished by any
conditions in the acts under which the State was admitted to the Union,” and he further argued that “any
conditions imposed by Congress ‘would not operate to restrict the State’s legislative power in respect of any
matter which was not plainly within the regulating power of Congress.’” Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065,
1067 (10th Cir. 1985) (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567, 573–74 (1911)). The Potter court assumed
“arguendo” that these conditions did violate the equal footing doctrine but found that since the state of Utah
had not attempted to change its laws about polygamy, its power had not been diminished, and therefore the
challenge to the bigamy law on this basis “lack[ed] merit.” Id. at 1067–68. One need not assume that the equal
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does produce despotic government, and the Reynolds Court had no way to
prove that it did. The Court credited this insight to Professor Francis Lieber, a
German educated immigrant who is considered the “founder of American
political science,”59 but whom we might today view more as a political or
anthropological philosopher. His ideas were initially influenced by Georg W.F.
Hegel’s social and political philosophy60 and were somewhat derivative of
Hegel’s work.61 Both Hegel and Lieber relied upon account of societies outside
of Europe that preceded the development of anthropological methods of
objective observation and analysis and were undoubtedly tainted by racism.62
There are two main problems with using this potential state interest to
justify criminalizing polygamy. First, the relationship between family structure
and political form remains fundamentally speculative rather than empirical.
Indeed,
my
own
attempt
to
construct
a
more
modern
philosophical-anthropological-psychological analysis that can trace a necessary
relationship between monogamy and liberal democracy and between polygamy
and despotism along the grounds argued by Lieber and Hegel suffers from this
flaw. I summarize my account briefly here to demonstrate that the nature of
these arguments makes them both difficult to understand and perhaps
impossible to empirically prove.
[T]he contributions of the monogamous family to the modern liberal
state can be seen as three-fold: 1) within the monogamous family
children are nurtured to become individuals even as the individuality
of their parents is reinforced and further developed; 2) the
monogamous family provides a relatively weak hold on its members,
both grown children and marital partners, and has little social utility
beyond developing individuals and providing for their most particular
needs, thus requiring the existence of a separate public sphere where
individuality can be recognized as a universal quality of others that
must be protected by the rule of law rather than by love; and
footing doctrine was violated, however, if all states’ power over marriage is limited to monogamous marriage
because polygamous marriage undermines the preconditions of our national political structure.
59 Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1187 (D. Utah 2013) (quoting EDWIN BROWN FIRMAGE &
RICHARD COLLIN MANGRUM, ZION IN THE COURTS; A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS 155 (1988)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
60 Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex
Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1523 (1997) (showing that Lieber’s attendance at German universities
overlapped not only with lecture series given by Hegel but the growing influence of his thought).
61 Id. at 1523 n.120.
62 Id. at 1534 n.196 (noting that Hegel relied on Jesuit missionary accounts of Chinese government and
familial relations and that, while his accounts were skewed by racism, there was a kernel of truth to the claim
that Chinese family relationships were patriarchal and the government was despotic).
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3) monogamous marriage teaches autonomous individuals that social
unity is the true experience of individuality by making the
transcendent experience of romantic love inextricably tied to a legal
institution of marriage made possible by a state defined by the rule of
law.
....
. . . [P]olygamous marriages operate[] to devalue and repress the
individuality of all family members, promote[] the significance of
kinship ties in a way which prevent[s] notions of abstract equality
and common state citizenship, institutionalize[s] the expanded family
as the greater political structure, and socialize[s] its adherents to
accept personal, hierarchical rule as the model for the exercise of
governmental power.63

In truth, it is hard to imagine a court using an analysis like this to justify
criminalizing polygamy.
The reality is that not only have such relationships between family structure
and political structure not yet been proven by empirical social sciences, it is
not clear that this is something that will ever be possible. The complexity of
the causal relationships from individual psychology to social organization at
the level of a nation is far beyond at least our current social science capacities.
Perhaps for this reason, none of the subsequent cases of Potter, Green, or
Holm identified democracy versus despotism as a relevant state interest in
criminalizing polygamy. Scholarly testimony in Reference did touch upon the
possibility that monogamy “which represents a kind of sexual egalitarianism,
may have created the conditions for the emergence of democracy and political
equality, including women’s equality.”64 However, the Reference court

63 Maura I. Strassberg, The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy: Considering Polyamory, 31 CAP. U. L.
REV. 439, 474, 487 (2003); see also Strassberg, supra note 60, at 1518–23 (filling out Lieber’s analysis of
polygamy and the patriarchal principle); id. at 1532–36 (explaining Hegel’s theory of the relationship between
polygamy and despotism); id. at 1536–56 (developing a modern Hegelian theory of the relationship between
monogamy and liberal democracy); id. at 1576–94 (applying a revised gender-neutral theory to evaluate
nineteenth-century Mormon polygamy).
64 Reference, 2011 BCSC 1588, para. 167 (Can.) (quoting the introductory summary of the report of
Dr. Joseph Henrich, Associate Professor in the Psychology and Economics Departments at the University of
British Columbia). The court went on to quote extensively from Dr. Henrich’s report, which stated:

Monogamy may foster the emergence of democratic governance and female equality by:
•

Imposing the same rules on the king and peasant (each can only have one wife), which
established a first foothold on the principles of equality among men.
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concluded that it was not possible to say definitively that monogamy either
was or is essential to democracy.65 However, it is worth noting that no one has
disproved the connection between monogamy and a democratic, rights based
state either. The stakes may simply be larger than we can prove. Considering
this potential state interest from the perspective of different levels of scrutiny,
it may be that it could survive rational basis review. Whether it is
philosophical, historical, or even statistical analysis that suggests a connection,
it may be that a legislature could rationally rely on such scholarship to ban
polygamy. However, if heightened or strict scrutiny were to be applied, the
speculative nature of this harm might well ensure that it would not survive
scrutiny.
3. Maintaining the Network of Laws Governing Monogamy
The Potter court made no reference to a state interest in preventing
despotism but instead argued as follows: Utah “has established a vast and
convoluted network of other laws clearly establishing its compelling state
interest in and commitment to a system of domestic relations based exclusively
upon the practice of monogamy as opposed to plural marriage.”66 Subsequent
to Potter, the Supreme Court of Utah adopted this as a compelling state interest
as well, describing it as an interest “in maintaining its network of laws.”67
However, the fact that Utah has had a strong interest in monogamy as reflected
in its laws both protecting and relying upon monogamy does not make
“maintaining” this network of laws a legitimate, important, or even compelling
•

Reducing the competition for females, which decreases the tendency for males to tightly
control their wives and daughters—that is, imposing monogamy (on males and females)
reduces patriarchal motivations in males by reducing competition for females, which
may in turn permit more egalitarianism in the household.

•

Dissipating the pool of unmarried males that were previously harnessed by rulers in
wars of aggression.

Id.; see also id. para. 164 (noting the testimony of Dr. Scheidel “that it is plausible . . . that [socially imposed
universal monogamy] has been a contributing factor to . . . western development”). Quoting the testimony of
Professor John Witte, Jr., Professor and Director of the Center for the Study of Law and Religion at Emory
University, the court observed that the “mutuality inherent in the dyadic structure . . . produces children who
are habituated . . . to the norms of citizenship . . . [who] [a]re capable of seeing how authority and liberty can
properly be balanced, how equality and charity can properly be balanced,” and that this structure is thought to
be “the first school of justice.” Id. para. 174.
65 See id. paras. 534, 536 (noting that these conclusions were “more speculative and could not be as
thoroughly supported by empirical evidence”).
66 Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1985) (quoting Potter v. Murray City,
585 F. Supp. 1126, 1138 (D. Utah 1984)).
67 See State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 830 (Utah 2004).
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state interest. Indeed, this argument seems to fall within the fallacy of
assuming that what is the case ought to be the case. Indeed, this very same
argument either was68 or could easily have been made to oppose same-sex
marriage, which also required state laws to be adapted to situations not at issue
for different-sex marriages, and arguments of this sort did not even survive
rational basis review.69 It might be that such an interest would be sufficient to
survive a true rational basis evaluation, if that is what were appropriate for
polygamy prohibitions. However, a mere interest in not being bothered to
adjust a great many laws to accommodate polygamists would not seem
sufficient to justify burdening their more fundamental individual rights and
thus would not be viewed as an important or compelling state interest.
However, there is also a further problem with maintaining the “network of
laws” as a state interest. If we look at the district court opinion in Potter, which
first articulated this state interest later adopted by the Tenth Circuit, we find
the following statements justifying the State’s choice of monogamy as the
basis of its regulation of marriage: “In exercising that right, the state
‘represent[s] the collective expression of moral aspirations’ and there is ‘an
undeniable interest in ensuring that its rules of domestic relations reflect the
widely held values of its people.’”70 Since Lawrence v. Texas held that “the
fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting
the practice,”71 a default to majority morality as a justification for a criminal
law such as Utah’s bigamy law has been seen as problematic, if not
illegitimate. Nor do the facts in Brown fall within any of the possible limits set
out in Lawrence,72 as Kody Brown was only seeking to avoid criminal
prosecution for his religious marriages, not legal recognition of them.

68

The claim that the state had a legitimate interest in maintaining the “tradition” of different-sex
marriage was one of the state interests offered, unsuccessfully, to oppose recognition of same-sex marriage.
See, e.g., De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 655–56 (W.D. Tex. 2014). It was never entirely clear what
“tradition” meant, but it could have been understood to mean that the state had an interest in not having to
adjust a complicated system of law to cover same-sex couples.
69 Id.
70 Potter, 585 F. Supp. at 1138 (alteration in original) (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 399
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring)).
71 539 U.S. 538, 577 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
72 Id. at 578 (“The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be
injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not
involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must give formal
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”).
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Ultimately, the problem with the “network of laws” state interest is that it fails
both to explain the value of monogamy to the state and why allowing
polygamy would undermine this.
4. Marriage Fraud
The Green decision articulated three new state interests. First, “prohibiting
bigamy implicates the State’s interest in preventing the perpetration of
marriage fraud.”73 The problem with this state interest is not that it is not clear
or important but rather that it has no application to the modern practice of
polygamy at issue in Green. Utah’s bigamy statute addresses two distinct
phenomena: entering into a legal marriage that is in fact void because of a prior
existing legal marriage (bigamy) and entering into multiple concurrent marital
relationships with the full knowledge of all persons (polygamy).74 Prior to the
decision in Reynolds, Mormon polygamists did commit bigamy because they
attempted to legally marry multiple wives. While there was no secret about the
existence of other wives, there may have been a fraudulent aspect to creating
an appearance to each wife that their marriage was also legally recognized.
After Reynolds, Mormon polygamists eschewed more than one legal marriage
at a time. This left only the doubly fraudulent as bigamists because their
entrance into what appeared to be a legal marriage depended upon the new
spouse being unaware of both the existence of a legal wife and the void status
of their own marriage to the bigamist.75 Intentional polygamists, such as
Mormon Fundamentalists, have no need to commit fraud on anyone, as long as
they avoid seeking legal recognition for more than one marriage. As a result,
the state interest in preventing the perpetration of marriage fraud is not really
relevant to the polygamous marriages at issue in Green.

73

State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 830 (Utah 2004).
See id. at 825 (“A person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has a husband or wife or knowing the
other person has a husband or wife, the person purports to marry another person or cohabits with another
person.” (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101(1) (West 2003))).
75 The only possible fraud present in polygamy might be if it involved a marital solemnization ceremony
that suggested a legally recognized marriage would result and multiple spouses believed this to be true, despite
not having participated in the acquisition of a marriage license. For example, the wedding vows quoted in State
v. Holm included the words “lawful and wedded wife, and . . . lawful and wedded husband.” 137 P.3d 726, 736
(Utah 2006). However, there is no reason to think that either party thought a legal marriage would in fact
result. See id. at 759 n.1 (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). More importantly, there is
no reason to assume such fraud is necessarily a feature of intentional polygamy.
74
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5. Misuse of Government Benefits
A new state interest identified in Green was the state’s “interest in
preventing the misuse of government benefits associated with marital status.”76
However, we are not told by Green what this misuse is or how it is connected
to polygamy. There is simply no support given for the claim that “prohibiting
bigamy implicates th[is] State[] interest.”77
Three years later, the majority opinion in Holm did not mention this state
interest at all in justifying the prohibition on polygamy.78 The dissents in Holm
and Brown considered this state interest and dismissed it as unfounded. Taking
this language to refer to the collection of cash welfare benefits as unmarried
parents by nonlegally married polygamous wives,79 they argued that since
these “wives” were not and could not be legally married to the father of their
children, no fraud is involved in claiming benefits as unmarried.80
6. Protecting Women and Children from Abuse
The Green court found that the most important state interest implicated in
criminalizing polygamy was to “protect[] vulnerable individuals from
exploitation and abuse.”81 Citing a student note, the Green court stated that
“[t]he practice of polygamy, in particular, often coincides with crimes targeting
women and children. Crimes not unusually attendant to the practice of
polygamy include incest, sexual assault, statutory rape, and failure to pay child
support.”82 The Green court noted in a footnote that the facts in Green itself
illustrate this abuse, as Green was convicted of criminal nonsupport and rape

76

Green, 99 P.3d at 830.
See id.
78 See Holm, 137 P.3d at 743–45 (scrutinizing the criminalization of polygamy given the substantive due
process rights established by Lawrence but failing to mention preventing misuse of government benefits as a
state interest justifying the law).
79 Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1219 (D. Utah 2013).
80 Allegations of substantial cash assistance going to “unmarried” polygamous wives and their children
have largely been debunked. See Brooke Adams, Facts Don’t Fit Claims of FLDS Welfare Fraud, SALT LAKE
TRIB. (Jan. 4, 2009, 6:49 PM), http://www.sltrib.com/news/ci_11368343 (quoting Curt Stewart, spokesman for
the Utah Department of Workforce Services, as saying that they are not finding rampant welfare fraud in the
polygamous community).
81 Green, 99 P.3d at 830.
82 Id. (citing Richard A. Vazquez, Note, The Practice of Polygamy: Legitimate Free Exercise of Religion
or Legitimate Public Menace? Revisiting Reynolds in Light of Modern Constitutional Jurisprudence, 5 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 225, 239–45 (2001)).
77
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of a child in addition to bigamy.83 Similarly, the Holm decision repeated the
above quote in its substantive due process review of the bigamy law and noted
that Holm was a polygamist also convicted of unlawful sexual conduct with a
minor.84 The Green court, not the Holm court, added the argument that since
“the closed nature of polygamous communities makes obtaining evidence of
and prosecuting these crimes challenging,”85 prosecuting the polygamy “that
provides a favorable environment in which crimes of physical and sexual abuse
can thrive”86 is a reasonable strategy to protect women and children.87 Thus, in
both Green and Holm, this state interest was sufficient to survive rational basis
scrutiny. The court in Brown subjected this state interest to all three levels of
scrutiny, and not only did it find that this state interest was unable to survive
strict or heightened scrutiny, it also found that it could not survive rational
basis scrutiny,88 in direct contrast to Green and Holm. However, the argument
was the same, regardless of the scrutiny applied. This calls into question
whether the court in Brown truly applied a lower level of scrutiny here at all.
Looking more closely at the scrutiny of this state interest in Brown, it
appears that the summary and largely uncontested nature of the proceedings in
Brown had the largest impact here. The Brown court stated that although he
was “aware of the many reports that circulate implying ‘the possibility that
other criminal conduct may accompany the act of bigamy,’”89 “Defendant
provided no competent evidence appropriate for summary judgment that could
influence the court’s consideration.”90 However, it is not clear that the state
would have been able to submit evidence of the abuse of children and women
in polygamous families that went beyond anecdotal evidence arising out of
either specific prosecutions or reports of ex-community members about their
own experiences and observations.

83 Id. n.14. The court also cited State v. Kingston, 46 P.3d 761 (Utah Ct. App. 2002), as an additional
example, where the court of appeals affirmed the conviction of a polygamist for incest and sexual conduct with
a sixteen-year-old.
84 State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 730, 744 (Utah 2006).
85 Green, 99 P.3d at 830.
86 Id. (quoting Vazquez, supra note 82, at 243) (internal quotation mark omitted).
87 Id. (concluding that the interest in protecting women and children for exploitation and abuse is a
“legitimate, if not compelling, interest[] of the State”).
88 Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1221–25 (D. Utah 2013).
89 Id. at 1220–21 (footnote omitted) (quoting Holm, 137 P.3d at 775 (Durham, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
90 Id. at 1220 n.64.
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In the absence of available evidence of either a statistical correlation or
causal relationship between polygamy and such abuse,91 criminalizing
polygamy can only be a very rough method of trying to prevent such abuse,
which makes it impossible to meet the strict and heightened scrutiny
requirements that the means be “narrowly tailored” to achieve the state
objective. Thus, the Brown court argued that the criminalization of polygamy
has not been shown to be “a necessary tool for the state’s attacks of such
harms.”92 The State defended the law criminalizing polygamy alone as
necessary to address this abuse because evidence of such abuse is difficult to
obtain in the insular and tightly controlled polygamous communities. It is
easier to find evidence of bigamy, as polygamists are quite open about their
domestic arrangements within the community. Once a charge of bigamy has
been made, the State is in a better position “to gather the evidence required to
prosecute those engaged in more specific crimes.”93 The Brown court noted,
however, that Utah has specific laws that target incest, sexual conduct with
minors, domestic abuse, kidnapping, etc.94 and that there was no evidence to
suggest that the state had ever been unable to bring such a specific charge in a
case also involving polygamy.95 Indeed, the Brown court argued that the
criminalization of religious cohabitation through the bigamy statute actually
impaired the State’s ability to prosecute abuse,96 noting that the insular and
isolated nature of some of the more abusive polygamous practitioners was
itself a response to the historical criminal prosecution of polygamists97 that
resulted in mass arrests of fathers and mothers and traumatic separation of
parents from children.98

91

See Holm, 137 P.3d at 774 (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1220 (quoting Holm, 137 P.3d at 774 (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
93 Id. (quoting Holm, 137 P.3d at 775 (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
94 Id. at 1221.
95 Id. at 1220.
96 Id. at 1221; see also JANET BENNION, POLYGAMY IN PRIMETIME: MEDIA, GENDER, AND POLITICS IN
MORMON FUNDAMENTALISM 4 (2012) (noting that criminalization “makes it easier for abusive polygamists to
thrive in isolated, rural regions”); id. at 6 (recounting the testimony that decriminalization would “increase the
possibility that women and children living in polygamous structures could get help”).
97 Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1221.
98 See BENNION, supra note 96, at 27 (describing the 1953 Short Creek Raid, in which 31 men and
9 women were arrested, and 263 children were put into state custody).
92
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B. The Harms Identified in the British Columbia Reference
The Brown court found that the harms of polygamy identified in Reynolds,
Potter, Green, and Holm could not survive rational basis, heightened, or strict
scrutiny. In large part this was because the only credible harm of polygamy
that was identified was a possible association of abuse of women and children
with polygamy; however, the evidence of a connection between abuse and
polygamy seemed to be anecdotal at best. Whether this possible connection
should have been found insufficient to justify the law under rational basis
scrutiny is arguable, but it is certainly less so for heightened or strict scrutiny.
To survive the strict and heightened scrutiny requirement that the polygamy
law be narrowly tailored to prevent the harms of polygamy, the State needed to
show that there were specific harms that were more than tangentially
connected to polygamy. However, no prior opinion had gone beyond vague
claims about a relationship between forms of marriage and society, and the
State of Utah largely rested its arguments on these prior opinions. The court in
Reference remediates these failures by identifying wide ranging, inherent
harms of polygamy that make blanket criminalization the only effective way to
avoid these harms.
The Reference court identified the pressing and substantial objectives of the
Canadian statute criminalizing polygamy as “the prevention of harm to
women, to children and to society”99 and “the preservation of monogamous
marriage.”100 Ultimately, the court found that there was an inverse relationship
between polygamy and monogamy101: monogamy benefits women, children,
and society in precisely all the ways polygamy harms them.102 Furthermore, in
light of the court’s finding that decriminalization of polygamy would result in
a non-trivial increase in the practice of polygamy in Canada,103
decriminalization would directly threaten the practice of monogamy itself.104
This in turn would erode the benefits of monogamy to individuals and society,
even as it expanded the harms of polygamy to individuals and society.
The findings of the court concerning the harms of polygamy were based on
empirically grounded expert testimony as well as both positive and negative

99
100
101
102
103
104

Reference, 2011 BCSC 1588, para. 1331 (Can.).
Id. para. 1332.
Id. para. 885.
Id. para. 883.
Id. para. 576.
Id. para. 1343.
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personal accounts from individuals who had lived in polygamous
households.105 The three main expert witnesses providing evidence of the
harms of polygamy, benefits of monogamy, or both, were Dr. Joseph Henrich,
an evolutionary psychologist106 who conducted “an extensive review of the
academic literature on polygyny in the sciences and social sciences”107 for the
reference; Dr. Shoshana Grossbard, an economist108 with a special expertise in
the economic effects of polygyny, who presented economic analyses of
polygyny using data collected by others;109 and Dr. Rose McDermott,110 a
political scientist who engaged in both a review of the academic literature on
polygyny and produced an original statistical analysis undertaken specifically
for the reference.111 Dr. McDermott’s work is also the subject of a separate
article in this Issue. Dr. McDermott’s statistical analysis was based on a unique
dataset, WomanStats Project Database, with ten years of data about women
and children from 171 countries along with separate data on their nation
states.112
Dr. McDermott’s statistical analysis demonstrated that “the harms of
polygyny do not depend upon a particular regional, religious or cultural
context. They can be generalized, and they can be expected to occur wherever
polygyny exists.”113 The court noted that the “convergence of the evidence on
the question of harm, from high level predictions based on human evolutionary
psychology, to the recurring harms identified in intra-cultural and
cross-cultural studies, to the ‘on the ground’ evidence of polygyny in
contemporary North America . . . . [is] striking.”114 The court concluded that

105

Id. paras. 487–491.
Dr. Joseph Henrich is “an Associate Professor in the Psychology and Economics Departments at the
University of British Columbia. He also holds a prestigious Tier 1 Canada Research Chair in Culture,
Cognition and Evolution,” and he “was qualified as an expert in psychology, particularly evolutionary
psychology, in economics and in anthropology, as well as in the interdisciplinary field of culture, cognition
and co-evolution.” Id. para. 495.
107 Id. para. 496.
108 Dr. Grossbard is a Professor of Economics at San Diego State University. Id. para. 588.
109 Id. paras. 589–590.
110 “Dr. Rose McDermott is a Professor of Political Science at Brown University. She also holds an M.A.
in Experimental Social Psychology from Stanford University.” Id. para. 580.
111 Id. paras. 609–612 (describing the work of Dr. Rose McDermott); see also Rose McDermott &
Jonathan Cowden, Polygyny and Violence Against Women, 64 EMORY L.J. 1767 (2015).
112 Reference, 2011 BCSC 1588, paras. 613–615 (describing Dr. McDermott’s WomanStats Project
Database and another database).
113 Id. para. 624.
114 Id. para. 492.
106
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the harms of polygyny are “endemic [and] . . . inherent.”115 They “are not
simply the product of individual misconduct; they arise inevitably out of the
practice.”116 As a result, not only did the evidence show “a reasoned
apprehension of harm”117 sufficient to meet the Canadian legal standard for
criminalizing an activity,118 the court found that it also met a higher standard of
“demonstrat[ing] ‘concrete evidence’ of harm.”119
1. The Cruel Arithmetic of Polygamy
Any understanding of the harms arising from polygamy must begin with an
appreciation of the “‘cruel arithmetic’ of polygamy”120: “when some men are
able to have multiple wives simultaneously, other men will be unable to find
wives.”121 In particular, it is likely to be low-status men who will be most
likely to be unable to marry,122 as they will be the least attractive marriage
partners to potential wives and their families.123
A simple model of a polygynous society developed by Dr. Henrich shows
how even a low level of polygamy leads to a considerable pool of unmarried
men:
Imagine a society of 40 adults, 20 males and 20 females . . . Suppose
those 20 males vary from the unemployed high-school drop outs to
CEOs, or billionaires . . . Let’s assume that the twelve men with the
highest status marry 12 of the 20 women in monogamous marriages.
Then, the top five men (25% of the population) all take a second
wife, and the top two (10%) take a third wife. Finally, the top guy
takes a fourth wife. This means that of all marriages, 58% are
monogamous. Only men in the to [sic] 10% of status or wealth
married more than two women. The most wives anyone has is four.

115

Id. para. 1045.
Id.
117 Id. para. 772.
118 See id.
119 Id. para. 1044; see also id. para. 792 (finding that positive witness accounts could not withstand “the
overwhelming weight of the evidence that polygyny has harmful consequences for both the individuals
involved and the societies of which they are a part”).
120 Id. para. 1333.
121 Id. para. 505.
122 Id.
123 Id. paras. 500, 555.
116
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The degree of polygynous marriage is not extreme in cross-cultural
perspective . . . but it creates a pool of unmarried men equal to 40%
of the male population.124

Dr. McDermott found that “polygyny causes the proportion of young
unmarried men [to unmarried women] to be high, up to a ratio of 150 men to
100 women.”125
2. Harm to Polygynous Wives and Women in General
The harm to women from polygamy begins with the fact that polygamy
causes greater competition between men for wives, which “creates pressure to
recruit increasingly younger brides into the marriage market.”126 In polygynous
societies, woman are more likely to “marry[] before age 18, or be[] ‘promised’
in marriage prior to age 18.”127 At the same time, these polygynous wives will
have more children than monogamous wives.128 The harmful effects of “early
sexual activity, pregnancies and childbirth [and] . . . . [s]hortened inter-birth
intervals”129 include health impacts such as a greater likelihood of dying in
childbirth and living a shorter life.130 Early marriage also means that the
socioeconomic development of polygynous wives is limited131 as a result of
less education,132 lower literacy levels, and less participation in the labor
force.133
The competition for wives also “causes men (as fathers, husbands and
brothers) to seek to exercise more control over the choices of women,
increasing gender inequality and undermining female autonomy and rights.
This is exacerbated by larger age disparities between husbands and wives.”134
Women become “viewed as commodities.”135 This control and
commodification is reflected in numerous effects on women, widely ranging

124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

Id. para. 505 (omissions in original).
Id. para. 586.
Id. para. 779.
Id. para. 499; see also id. paras. 523–533, 621.
Id. para. 621.
Id. para. 784.
Id. para. 782.
Id. paras. 621, 784.
Id. paras. 622, 789.
Id. para. 533.
Id. para. 779.
Id. para. 532.
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from a lack of reproductive autonomy,136 leading to higher fertility,137 lower
levels of divorce,138 and greater levels of domestic violence,139 sex trafficking,
genital mutilation,140 and “discrimination under the law.”141 In addition,
women in polygynous relationships also have to deal with “co-wife
conflict,”142 high rates of marital dissatisfaction and low levels of
self-esteem,143 inadequate financial support “as resources may be inequitably
divided or simply insufficient,”144 and “higher rates of depressive disorders and
other mental health issues.”145
3. Harm to Children of Polygynous Families
Children, too, were found by the court to have worse outcomes in
polygamous families because polygamy causes men to “reduce investment in
wives and offspring as they spread their resources more thinly across larger
families and increasingly channel those resources into obtaining more
wives.”146 The court found that harm to children included the following:
higher infant mortality . . . more emotional, behavioural and physical
problems, as well as lower educational achievement . . . . [arising out
of] higher levels of conflict, emotional stress and tension in
polygynous families . . . . inability of fathers to give sufficient
affection and disciplinary attention to all of their children
[and] . . . . enhanced risk of psychological and physical abuse and
neglect.147

Lack of educational opportunities due to limited financial resources are not
limited to girls but also affect boys in polygynous families.148
For young men and boys, “[t]he sex ratio imbalance inherent in polygyny
means that young men are forced out of polygamous communities to sustain

136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

Id. para. 782.
Id. para. 621.
Id. paras. 532–533.
Id. paras. 584, 621.
Id. para. 621.
Id. para. 622.
Id. para. 584.
Id. para. 782.
Id.
Id.; see also id. paras. 603, 607–608, 696, 699–700, 780.
Id. para. 779.
Id. para. 783; see also id. para. 603.
Id. para. 621.
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the ability of senior men to accumulate more wives. These young men and
boys often receive limited education . . . few life skills and little social
support.”149 As a result, these young men and boys achieve lower levels of
employment.150
4. General Social Harms
Many of the individual impacts of polygyny on women, men, and children
can also be seen to have larger social consequences. We have seen that the
cruel arithmetic of polygamy creates a pool of unmarried men, who are likely
low status. In highly polygynous closed communities, this results in “[u]p to
half of the boys . . . [being] ejected from their communities.”151 Considering
that these boys are minimally educated but must support themselves, they are
likely to become either an economic burden or drag on the society they end up
in. To the extent that this pool of men cannot be dumped on a non-polygynous
society but would remain within their original polygynous society, they are
“incentivized to take substantial risks so they can eventually participate in the
mating and marriage market.”152 Statistically, this can be shown to take the
form of increased levels of violence, crime, and other antisocial behaviors.153
On a larger social level, Dr. Henrich more speculatively predicted that the pool
of unmarried men could lead to greater military aggression towards other
communities or nations.154 This aggression could arise from a perceived need
to prevent competition for existing unmarried women from men outside the
community or as providing a source of new potential wives or resources that
would allow the acquisition of wives. Alternatively, war may simply be a way
for rulers to direct the antisocial tendencies of these men outside the
community, while at the same time reducing their numbers through
casualties.155 These speculations were supported to some extent by Dr.
McDermott’s findings that “[s]tates with higher levels of polygyny spend more
money per capita on defence, particularly on arms expenditures.”156 This leads

149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

Id. para. 785.
Id. para. 586.
Id. paras. 586, 789.
Id. para. 505.
Id. paras. 499, 507–516, 587, 787.
Id. paras. 534, 536.
Id. para. 536.
Id. para. 621.
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to less spending on “domestic infrastructure and projects geared toward health
and education.”157
Polygynous societies will have greater levels of familial poverty.158 This is
due to a number of factors. Women’s ability to support their children is
reduced due to high fertility159 and minimal education.160 Furthermore, the
gender inequality that is associated with polygyny is not only a harm to
individuals but harmful to society itself.161 At the same time, men’s investment
in their wives and children is reduced as described above.162 Societies where
basic needs are not met do not have the human resources necessary to grow
and may also be less stable politically, requiring more authoritarian
government.163 Dr. McDermott’s analysis showed that “[s]tates with higher
levels of polygyny display fewer political rights and civil liberties for both men
and women than those with less polygyny.”164 Theoretical economic models
using data from highly polygynous states showed that the imposition of
monogamy would increase per capita GDP because men “save and invest in
production and consumption” instead of saving for and investing in additional
wives.165
Finally, the court in Reference found polygamy harmful to society because
it directly threatens the practice of monogamy, even in a country such as
Canada.166 This could occur in four ways. First, the court found that
decriminalizing polygamy would make immigration to Canada by polygamists
from other counties more attractive.167 Second, decriminalization would allow
those already in Canada who are familiar with and comfortable with the
practice to take it up.168 Third, decriminalization would remove a brake on the
natural tilt of human beings “towards a polygynous mating system.”169 Fourth,
the increased fertility of polygamous wives will cause the population of those
157

Id. para. 790.
Id. para. 787.
159 Id.
160 Id. para. 789.
161 Id. para. 787.
162 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
163 Reference, 2011 BCSC 1588, para. 787.
164 Id. para. 621.
165 Id. para. 535.
166 Cf. Potter v. Murray City, 585 F. Supp. 1126, 1139–40 (D. Utah 1984) (arguing that should polygamy
be decriminalized, and perhaps even legally recognized, it would be difficult to contain).
167 Reference, 2011 BCSC 1588, paras. 556, 558, 560, 567–568, 570, 573, 1317.
168 Id. para. 575.
169 Id. paras. 500–501, 575, 1304.
158
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raised in polygamy to increase faster than the population of those raised in
monogamy.170 As the practice of polygamy increases, the benefits of
monogamy decrease. The court found the specific benefits of monogamy to be
as follows:
[E]xclusive and enduring monogamous marriage is the best way to
ensure paternal certainty and joint parental investment in children. It
best ensures that men and women are treated with equal dignity and
respect, and that husbands and wives (or same sex couples), and
parents and children, provide each other with mutual support,
protection and edification through their lifetimes.171

5. Scrutiny of the Infringements to Liberty and Freedom of Religion
In considering the constitutional challenge to the polygamy law based on
its infringement of liberty172 and freedom of religion173 interests guaranteed by
the Canadian Charter, the breadth and the depth of the demonstrated harms of
polygamy played a significant role in the court’s analysis. With regard to the
liberty interest, the court dismissed claims that the law criminalizing polygamy
was overbroad,174 arbitrary,175 or grossly disproportional.176 As a result, the
court found that it did not constitute a deprivation of liberty inconsistent with
principles of fundamental justice.177
Addressing the freedom of religion infringement,178 the court found the law
criminalizing polygamy furthered the goal of limiting the harms of polygamy
by preventing a non-trivial increase in the incidence of polygamy.179 The fact
that there had been very few prosecutions under the law did not suggest
otherwise to the court. The lack of prosecutions could result from enforcement
170

Id. paras. 555, 621, 649.
Id. para. 884.
172 Id. paras. 1113–1134.
173 Id. paras. 1093, 1096–1098 (holding that prohibiting polygamy breaches 2(a) of the Charter).
174 Id. paras. 1190–1195 (dismissing claims that criminalization of polygamous unions that do not involve
abuse is overbroad due to the many other harms of polygamy); id. para. 1144 (dismissing claims that existing
criminal laws narrowly targeting specific abuses are sufficient to prevent the harms that might arise from
polygamy since the harms of polygamy go well beyond criminal spousal or child abuse).
175 Id. para. 1209. The court did find that the law was arbitrary as it punished minors between the ages of
12 and 17 who might be polygamous wives. Id. paras. 1199–1203.
176 Id. paras. 1213–1223.
177 Id. paras. 1177, 1266.
178 This required the court to answer the questions: “i. Is the limit rationally connected to the
purpose? ii. Does the limit minimally impair the Charter right? iii. Is the law proportionate in its effect?” Id.
para. 1273.
179 Id. para. 1336.
171
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priorities or actually show the effectiveness of the law in deterring
polygamy.180 In finding that the law minimally impairs religious freedom, the
court stated:
When one accepts that there is a reasoned apprehension that
polygamy is inevitably associated with sundry harms, and that these
harms are not simply isolated to criminal adherents like Warren Jeffs
but inhere in the institution itself, the Amicus’ complaint that there
are less sweeping means of achieving the government’s objective
falls away. And it most certainly does when one considers the
positive objective of the measure, the protection and preservation of
monogamous marriage. For that, there can be no alternative to the
outright prohibition of that which is fundamentally anathema to the
institution. In the context of this objective, there is no such thing as
so-called “good polygamy.”181

Finally, the court considered whether the criminalization of polygamy satisfied
the proportionality test, which required weighing the deleterious effects of the
law on religious freedom against the salutary effects of the law on its
objectives.182 The court found that the law did result in a significant
interference with religious beliefs for fundamentalist Mormons,183 causing
them either to avoid a crucial religious practice or to suffer isolation and
insularity to avoid prosecution.184 On the salutary side, the court listed
“advanc[ing] the institution of monogamous marriage, . . . protect[ing] against
the many harms . . . of polygamy,”185 and “further[ing] Canada’s international
human rights obligations.”186 Thus, the court concluded that, as applied to
persons who marry into polygamy at age eighteen or older, the law
criminalizing polygamy is consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.
6. Summary
No conclusion about strict, heightened, or rational basis scrutiny of the
Utah bigamy law can be made on the basis of the constitutional analysis in
Reference, as it was operating both with a different criminal law and under a
180
181
182
183
184
185
186

Id. paras. 1337–1339.
Id. para. 1343.
Id. paras. 1346, 1350.
Id. para. 1348.
Id. para. 1349.
Id. para. 1350.
Id. para. 1351.
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distinctly Canadian standard of constitutional review. However, the more
detailed and empirically supported harms of polygamy articulated there should
be more than sufficient to pass ordinary rational basis scrutiny. The
overbreadth arguments made in Reference were largely identical to those made
in Brown187 but were strongly countered by the exceedingly broad harmful
impacts of polygamy. Thus, there is reason to think that the Utah bigamy law
could pass heightened or strict scrutiny as well. However, the viability of the
law would be greatly increased if strict or heightened scrutiny was not found to
be appropriate. Thus, the second half of this Article turns to the arguments
made in Brown to justify strict and heightened scrutiny.
II. NEITHER STRICT NOR HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY OF THE UTAH BIGAMY LAW
WAS JUSTIFIED IN BROWN
After the first episode of TLC’s reality television show Sister Wives aired,
Utah state officials started a criminal investigation of the Brown family
featured in the show, consisting of Kody Brown and his wives Meri, Janelle,
Christine, and Robyn. The Browns are members of the Apostolic United
Brethren, who believe that “polygamy is a core religious practice.”188 Although
the Browns moved to Nevada to avoid a possible prosecution, Utah officials
continued the investigation. As a result, the Browns filed an action in the
United States District Court for the District of Utah challenging the
constitutionality of Utah’s statute criminalizing polygamy on multiple grounds,
including under the Free Exercise Clause, the Smith Hybrid Rights Analysis
framework, and the Due Process Clause.189 After the Browns moved for
summary judgment, it does not appear that the State mounted a strong defense,
as the court noted that it was “intrigued by the sheer lack of response in

187 Compare id. paras. 1142–1145 (summarizing arguments that the Canadian statute was overbroad
because it prohibits polygamous relationships between consenting adults, penalizes coerced spouses the same
as coercing spouses, penalizes beneficial polygamous relationships, and fails to address the actual abusive
harms, which are in any event already addressed by other criminal statutes), with Brown v. Buhman, 947 F.
Supp. 2d 1170, 1219–21 (D. Utah 2013) (finding Utah statute not narrowly tailored because there was no
evidence of a causal relationship between polygamy and sexual abuse and financial neglect of children and
other criminal statutes are sufficient to address these abuses).
188 Brown, 947. F. Supp. 2d at 1178 & n.5.
189 Id. at 1776. The investigation was closed after the constitutional challenge was filed, and the State then
sought to dismiss the case for mootness, thus avoiding the constitutional review of the statute. However, while
the current prosecutor assured the court that he would not prosecute the Browns unless he were to find that
they also committed a collateral crime, such as child or spousal abuse, he could not assure the court that a
future prosecutor would not seek to charge the Browns for their polygamy. Id. at 1179.
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Defendant’s filing to Plaintiffs seven detailed constitutional claims.”190 The
court granted summary judgment to the Browns, finding the bigamy statute
unconstitutional as applied to Brown’s religious polygamous marriage under
strict scrutiny, heightened scrutiny, or rational basis scrutiny.
A. Strict Scrutiny of Polygamy Law Under Hialeah’s Free Exercise Analysis
1. Federal Precursors to the Utah Statute
The first polygamy statute covering United States territories was enacted by
Congress in 1862 and made it a crime for a person with a living spouse to
marry another.191 There is no question that it was motivated by the otherwise
legal polygamous marriages being then celebrated by the Mormon Church.192
George Reynolds was prosecuted under this law for entering into a licensed
marriage with a second wife.193 When Mormon polygamists attempted to
evade the statute by legally marrying multiple wives simultaneously or by not
obtaining marriage licenses for multiple wives married in religious ceremonies,
the statute was amended in 1887 to cover both simultaneous marriages and
cohabitation with more than one woman.194 There is some disagreement about
the purpose of adding cohabitation to the statute. Brown contends that it was
added because common law marriage was recognized in the Utah Territory,
and therefore a religious ceremony followed by cohabitation would have
created multiple legal marriages.195 However, in Cannon v. United States,196
the United States Supreme Court suggested that cohabitation was included
within the polygamy statute because “[b]igamy and polygamy might fail of
proof, for want of direct evidence of any marriage, but cohabitation with more
than one woman . . . was susceptible of the proof here given . . . the exhibition
of all the indicia of a marriage, a household, and a family, twice repeated.”197
In the absence of a license and legal solemnization of the marriage,
evidence of a “marriage” might be difficult to obtain. Furthermore, a three-year
statute of limitations would further limit prosecution even if proof of marriage
190

Id. at 1176–77.
Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act, ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501, 501 (1862) (repealed 1910).
192 Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1205–06.
193 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 148 (1879).
194 Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Act of 1882, ch. 47, § 3, 22 Stat. 30, 31 (repealed 1910).
195 Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1205–06.
196 116 U.S. 55 (1885) (upholding the conviction of a man for cohabiting with multiple women despite no
proof of sexual intercourse), vacated, 118 U.S. 355 (1886).
197 Id. at 75.
191
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were possible. Cohabitation, however, would be ongoing and publicly
observable. Thus, Congress made “polygamy a continuous offense . . . .
[w]hether marriage took place or not, the pretense of marriage—the living, to
all intents and purposes, so far as the public could see, as husband and wife—a
holding out of that relationship to the world,—were the evils sought to be
eradicated.”198
Indeed, Cannon held that “cohabitation” in the statute did not even require
proof that “he and the two women, or either of them, occupied the same bed or
slept in the same room, or that he had sexual intercourse with either of them”
as long as “he lived in the same house with the two women, and ate at their
respective tables one-third of his time or thereabouts, and held them out to the
world, by his language or conduct, or both, as his wives.”199 The Court was
quite clear that there were other possible meanings of cohabitation that
required sexual intercourse, such as adulterous cohabitation: “It is the practice
of unlawful cohabitation with more than one woman that is aimed at—a
cohabitation classed with polygamy and having its outward semblance . . . .
not . . . meretricious, unmarital intercourse with more than one woman.”200
2. History and State Interpretation of Utah’s Current Bigamy Statute
The Mormon Church renounced polygamy as a religious practice in 1890,
paving the way for Utah to be admitted to the Union as a state.201 Still
concerned with the possibility that polygamy would be legalized by the state
legislature after statehood, the Utah Enabling Act conditioned admission upon
the prohibition of “polygamous or plural marriages.”202 This language was then
included within the Utah Constitution and is known as the “irrevocable
ordinance.”203 In addition, the Utah Constitution provided that a territorial
statute criminalizing polygamy and unlawful cohabitation would continue to be
in force.204 Criminalization of both polygamy (understood as marrying another
while having a spouse still living) and cohabitation (understood as living

198

See United States v. Cannon, 7 P. 369, 374 (Utah 1885).
Cannon, 116 U.S. at 71.
200 Id. at 72.
201 Strassberg, supra note 60, at 1504 n.5.
202 ch. 138, § 3, 28 Stat. 107, 108 (1894).
203 State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 738 (Utah 2006).
204 UTAH CONST. art. III; see also State v. Norman, 52 P. 986, 990–91 (Utah 1898) (holding that the
language should not be interpreted to exclude offenses covered beyond just polygamy).
199
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together as husband and wife) continued under various statutes205 until 1973,
when the statute was rewritten in its present form: “A person is guilty of
bigamy when, knowing that he has a husband or wife or knowing the other
person has a husband of wife, the person purports to marry another person or
cohabits with another person.”206 To follow the analysis below, it will be
helpful to list and distinguish the various marital forms covered by the statute:
1. Fraudulent bigamy, additional “legal” marriage by a legally married
person with a person who is unaware both of the first legal spouse and
the void status of their own marriage, is covered under the “purports to
marry” language.
2. Legal polygamy, attempted multiple legal marriages without any fraud
to the marriage partners, is covered under the “purports to marry”
language.
3. Polygamous marriages, ceremonial marriages to multiple spouses
without seeking legal recognition of more than one marriage, is covered
under the “purports to marry” language.
4. Polygamous cohabitation, multiple marital relationships, is covered
under the “cohabits” language.
In State v. Green, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the meaning of
cohabitation in the course of holding that it was not unconstitutionally
vague.207 Green was a Fundamentalist Mormon polygamist who did not
attempt to legally marry more than one wife at a time; he would divorce the
wife he was legally married to before getting a license and entering into a legal
marriage with another wife.208 Some wives he never legally married but
instead married in an unlicensed religious ceremony.209 The State alleged that
Green had cohabited with four women while legally married to a fifth and thus
sought to bring his conduct under the cohabitation prong of the bigamy
statute.210 In support of his as-applied vagueness challenge, Green alleged that
the statute failed to make clear “how often he could legally reside with and
have sexual contact with the women,”211 in effect suggesting that had he had

205 State v. Barlow, 153 P.2d 647, 651–52 (Utah 1944) (holding that the prohibition of cohabitation was
not unconstitutionally vague).
206 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101(1) (West 2004).
207 99 P.3d 820, 832 (Utah 2004).
208 Id. at 822.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 823.
211 Id. at 831.
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less sexual contact or spent less time at home, he might have avoided being
viewed as cohabiting. The Green court found that Green had clearly engaged
in bigamous cohabitation because his conduct “produced precisely the situation
that bigamy statutes aim to prevent—all the indicia of marriage repeated more
than once.”212 This closely follows the language used in Cannon to interpret
the federal statute.213 The “indicia” relied upon in Green to show cohabitation
did not include the religious marriage ceremonies.214
In State v. Holm, the Utah Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the
meaning of “purports to marry” in the 1973 bigamy statute. Holm was, like
Green, a member of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints.215 After legally marrying Suzie Stubbs, he entered into a religious
marriage with Wendy Holm.216 Later, at the age of thirty-two, he entered into a
religious marriage with sixteen-year old Ruth Stubbs, the sister of Suzie.217 By
shortly after her eighteenth birthday, Ruth had borne two children.218 Holm
was arrested and charged with both bigamy and unlawful sexual conduct with
a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old.219 The jury special verdict form showed that
Holm was found “guilty of bigamy both because he ‘purported to marry Ruth
Stubbs’ and because he had ‘cohabited with Ruth Stubbs.’”220

212

Id. at 831–32 (“[Green] referred to each of these women as a wife, regardless of whether a licensed
marriage existed. The women likewise considered themselves Green’s wives and adopted his surname. Green
spent nights with each woman on a rotating schedule and succeeded in impregnating these four women
eighteen times . . . . The children born of these associations also use the Green surname. Together, Green and
the women undertook spousal and parental obligations. . . . [T]hey shared a group of mobile homes, ‘Green
Haven,’ that possessed common areas for the entire family’s use.”).
213 See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
214 Green’s prosecution for cohabitation rather than for purporting to marry by either invalid licensed
marriages or unlicensed ceremonial marriages was dictated by the facts in his case. He had sequentially legally
married and then divorced three of the five wives named in the indictment. 99 P.3d at 822 n.4. Of the two
nonlegal religious marriage ceremonies that could have come under the purport to marry language, at least one
took place outside of Utah, State v. Green, 108 P.3d 710, 713 (Utah 2005), and both were outside the four year
statute of limitations for felonies, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-302 (LexisNexis 1999), by the time of the 2000
indictment. See Green, 99 P.3d at 822 n.4, 823; see also State v. Ishaque, 711 A.2d 416, 418 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1997) (“[C]ourts have consistently ruled that they are without jurisdiction to prosecute a defendant
for a bigamous marriage solemnized in another state.”).
215 State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 730 (Utah 2006).
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 731.
220 Id. at 731–32.
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To uphold Holm’s conviction, the court needed to find only that his
conduct fell within one of the two prongs of the bigamy statute.221 The court
upheld the conviction under the “purports to marry” prong.222 This first
involved dismissing Holm’s statutory argument that the “purports to marry”
language was meant to refer only to attempts to legally marry more than one
person at a time (marital forms 1 and 2 above), which would have excluded
Holm’s multiple religious marriages.223 The Holm court distinguished
attempted second legal marriages (marital forms 1 and 2 above) from second
marriages not seeking legal recognition (“a second marriage (however
defined)”)224 (marital form 3 above) and both of these from cohabitation
(“cohabitation alone”)225 (marital form 4 above). An attempted legal marriage
would require both a license and a solemnization ceremony under Utah law.226
A marriage not seeking legal recognition would be entered into by
participation in a solemnization ceremony without having procured a marriage
license:
But while a marriage license represents a contract between the State
and the individuals entering into matrimony, the license itself is
typically of secondary importance to the participants in a wedding
ceremony. The crux of marriage in our society, perhaps especially a
religious marriage, is not so much the license as the solemnization,
viewed in its broadest terms as the steps, whether ritualistic or not, by
which two individuals commit themselves to undertake a marital
relationship.227

In the absence of a license, the solemnization would not be a legal
solemnization, but it would nonetheless evidence the parties’ intent to enter
into a marital relationship or “marriage.”
The court then found that the word “marriage” was not limited in meaning
to legal marriage, as dictionary definitions for such words as bigamy and
polygamy describe them as including both a legal marriage and a marriage to
someone else.228 Thus the court concluded that “the plain meaning of the term

221 Id. at 732 (“Due to the nature of the special verdict form, on appeal Holm must convince this court that
both prongs of Utah’s bigamy statute have been inappropriately applied in his case.”).
222 Id. at 737.
223 Id. at 732.
224 Id. at 735.
225 Id.
226 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-7 (West 2014) (requiring a state license for solemnization of a marriage).
227 Holm, 137 P.3d at 737.
228 Id. at 733.
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‘marry,’ . . . supports our conclusion that it encompasses both marriages that
are legally recognized and those that are not.”229 Furthermore, the Holm court
noted that the inclusion of cohabitation as bigamy itself revealed the
legislature’s intent to extend bigamy beyond attempts to enter into multiple
legal marriages. In applying its construction of “purports to marry” as
including “claiming to marry”230 “without claiming any legal recognition of
the marital relationship”231 to the facts of Holm’s relationship to Stubbs, the
Holm court found that the solemnization ceremony that Holms and Stubbs
participated in was “in every material respect, indistinguishable from a
marriage ceremony to which this State grants legal recognition on a daily
basis.”232
Thus, under Green and Holm, the bigamy statute would apply to three
distinct factual situations: attempting to legally marry someone while already
legally married to another (marital forms 1 and 2 covered under purporting to
marry), ceremonially marrying someone while already legally married to
another (marital form 3, also covered under purporting to marry), and
cohabiting as husband and wife with someone while already legally married to
another (marital form 4, covered under cohabiting).
3. Hialeah
Brown’s determination that the bigamy statute should be subject to strict
scrutiny233 arose out of a free exercise analysis under Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah. In Hialeah, the Supreme Court evaluated
several ordinances prohibiting and regulating animal sacrifices passed in
response to the establishment of a Santeria Church.234 The Santeria religion
engages in animal sacrifice as part of its rituals, after which the animal is often
but not always eaten.235 While Employment Division v. Smith236 had found that
“a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a
compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of
229

Id. at 734.
Id. at 736.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 737; see also id. at 736 (describing the ceremony and vows, the white “wedding dress” worn by
Stubbs, and her characterization of the ceremony “as a marriage”).
233 Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1217 (D. Utah 2013).
234 508 U.S. 520, 525–26 (1993).
235 Id. at 525.
236 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that a law prohibiting the use of peyote did not unconstitutionally
infringe upon the free exercise rights of Native Americans who use peyote in religious rituals).
230
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burdening a particular religious practice,”237 Hialeah established the opposite
rule: a law that is not neutral and of general applicability “must be justified by
a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance
that interest.”238
Neutrality will be absent when “the object of a law is to infringe upon or
restrict practices because of their religious motivation.”239 When a law is
facially neutral, it is necessary to look at “the effect of a law in its real
operation”240 to determine its object. At the same time, citing two polygamy
cases, the Supreme Court noted that an adverse impact on a religious practice
is not necessarily evidence that the religion has been targeted because “a social
harm may have been a legitimate concern of government for reasons quite
apart from discrimination.”241 In evaluating the ordinances in light of the stated
public objectives of avoiding health risks, emotional injury to children,
protecting animals from cruel and unnecessary killing, and confining animal
slaughter to areas zoned for it, the Court found them to produce a “religious
gerrymander.”242 “[F]ew if any killings of animals are prohibited other than
Santeria sacrifice . . . . although . . . killings that are no more necessary or
humane in almost all other circumstances are unpunished.”243 In addition, more
religious conduct was prohibited than was necessary to advance the stated
government objectives244 as more narrowly tailored regulations addressing
conditions, treatment, and methods of slaughter would have directly addressed
the city’s objectives. In finding the ordinances not to be neutral, Justice
Kennedy and Justice Stevens also found relevant historical evidence
surrounding the enactment of the ordinances showing animosity towards
Santeria, including the events that triggered the ordinances and statements
made by the city council.245

237

See Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 531 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. 872).
Id. at 531–32.
239 Id. at 533.
240 Id. at 535.
241 Id. The Court cited Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), where the Court previously held that mere
membership in the Mormon Church, which at the time was still performing polygamous marriages, was a
legitimate basis for denying an applicant the right to vote, and Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 535.
242 Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 535 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 696
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
243 Id. at 536.
244 Id. at 538.
245 Id. at 540–41 (plurality opinion).
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In addition, a law burdening religion must be generally applicable; it
“cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by
religious belief.”246 It cannot “target or single out” religious conduct.247 To
determine whether the animal sacrifice ordinances were generally applicable,
the Supreme Court looked to see whether they were underinclusive relative to
their stated objectives.248 The Court found these ordinances underinclusive
with regard to all four of the objectives, failing to regulate nonreligious killings
of animals to address these concerns.249 Thus, it concluded that they were “a
prohibition that society is prepared to impose upon [Santeria worshippers] but
not upon itself.”250
Once a law is found to be not neutral or not of general application, strict
scrutiny is called for: “a law restrictive of religious practice must advance
‘interests of the highest order’ and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those
interests.”251 The Court stated that both the overinclusiveness and
underinclusiveness of the ordinances showed that it was not narrowly tailored.
In addition, the underinclusiveness of the ordinances revealed that the interests
sought to be advanced were not of the highest order or compelling, as a
compelling interest would be more rigorously advanced.252
4. Free Exercise Challenges to the Utah Bigamy Statute Before Brown
In both Green and Holm, the Utah Supreme Court had considered a free
exercise challenge to the Utah bigamy law in the context of prosecutions of
Mormon fundamentalist polygamists. Applying the Hialeah analysis, the court
concluded that the statute was operationally neutral and generally
applicable.253 The Utah Supreme Court justified its determination that the
bigamy statute was operationally neutral by noting that the bigamy statute
“contains no exemptions that would restrict the practical application of the
246

Id. at 543 (majority opinion).
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (finding promissory estoppel was a law of
general applicability that could be used to force a newspaper to pay damages for breaking a confidentiality
promise without offending the First Amendment). Cohen was cited by Hialeah as an example of the principle
of general applicability. 508 U.S. at 543.
248 Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 543.
249 Id. at 543–46.
250 Id. at 545 (alteration in original) (quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 542 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
251 Id. at 546 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)).
252 Id. at 546–47.
253 State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 742 (Utah 2006) (following Green’s free exercise analysis); State v.
Green, 99 P.3d 820, 827–28 (Utah 2004).
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statute only to [religious] polygamists. In fact, the last reported decision of a
prosecution under the current bigamy statute in our state courts involved a man
who committed bigamy for non-religious reasons.”254 In the case referred to,
State v. Geer,255 the defendant was charged with “purport[ing] to marry
another person” while “knowing [that] he . . . has a wife.”256 The case involved
typical fraudulent bigamy (marital form 1), in which a man purported to legally
marry a woman who was unaware that he was already legally married to
another woman.257 There was no evidence of any religious motivation in the
case of Geer’s multiple marriages; indeed, Geer unsuccessfully attempted to
challenge his conviction on the ground that the State of Utah “selectively
prosecutes only those bigamists who practice bigamy for other than religious
reasons.”258
By mentioning Geer as proof that Utah’s bigamy statute operated to punish
nonreligious bigamy, we can see that the Green court’s operational neutrality
analysis considered the bigamy statute as a whole. Rather than limiting its
analysis strictly to the cohabitation prong Green was prosecuted under, it
looked at the operational impact of both prongs and saw that while the
cohabitation prong reached a religious polygamist in Green, the purport to
marry prong in another case had reached a nonreligious polygamist.
5. Brown’s Hialeah Analysis of the Utah Bigamy Statute
The Brown court found that the bigamy statute was “neither operationally
neutral nor generally applicable.”259 I will offer three criticisms of this result.
First, I will argue that the Brown court treated a single statute as if it were two
separate statutes, which allowed it to improperly find that part of the bigamy
statute was not operationally neutral. Second, I will argue that even as divided
by the Brown court, all parts of the statute are operationally neutral. The third
argument is one I have already made in large part above, that even if the statute
were not operationally neutral, it would survive strict scrutiny.

254
255
256
257
258
259

Green, 99 P.3d at 827.
765 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101(1) (West 2004).
Geer, 765 P.2d at 2.
Id. at 3.
Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1217 (D. Utah 2013).
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a. Divide and Conquer
The first step in the Brown court’s analysis was to reorganize the three
targets of the statute as interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court in Green and
Holm into what it saw as only two distinct targets. The first target, which fell
within the purports to marry language, covers ineffective attempts to enter into
multiple legal marriages, which the court called “actual bigamy”260 (marital
form 1 above) and “actual polygamy”261 (marital form 2 above). An example
of actual bigamy would be the Geer case, in which no religious motivation was
behind the multiple marriages.262 An example of actual polygamy would be the
Reynolds case, in which the multiple marriages were religiously motivated.263
The second target of the statute according to the Brown court, which fell under
both the purports to marry and cohabitation language, was what the Brown
court called “religious cohabitation.”264 The Brown court defined “religious
cohabitation” variously throughout the opinion as “to practice polygamy
[]through private ‘spiritual’ marriages not licensed or otherwise sanctioned by
the state”265 and “choosing ‘to enter into a relationship that [they know] would
not be legally recognized as marriage, [they use] religious terminology to
describe the relationship . . . [including] marriage and husband and
wife [which] happens to coincide with the terminology used by the state to
describe the legal status of married persons.’”266 Examples of religious
cohabitation would be Green (marital form 4 above) and Holm (marital form 3
above).
The second step in the Brown court’s analysis was to evaluate these two
broader targets separately for purposes of the operational neutrality analysis,267
rather than evaluate the statute as a whole as the court in Green and Holm had
done. The Brown court found the “actual bigamy” and “actual polygamy”
target of the statute to be operationally neutral because the presence or absence
of religious motivation was not determinative of the offense.268 At the same
time, removing “actual bigamy,” the nonreligiously motivated multiple legal
260

Id. at 1209.
Id. at 1190.
262 Geer, 765 P.2d at 3.
263 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161 (1879).
264 Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1198.
265 Id. at 1181.
266 Id. at 1197 (first two alterations in original) (quoting State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 773 (Utah 2006)
(Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (some internal quotation marks omitted).
267 Id. at 1203–05.
268 Id. at 1209.
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marriages found in Geer, left religious cohabitation as, in the view of the
Brown court,269 the only remaining target of the statute.
If, on the other hand, religious cohabitation is understood as a target along
with nonreligious bigamy, then what the Brown court was willing to see as the
operational neutrality of the “actual bigamy” and “actual polygamy” target
would have extended over all the targets of the statute. Indeed, one might ask
why the Brown court was justified in lumping together actual bigamy and
actual polygamy in one operational neutrality analysis of the purports to marry
language, while removing cases of religious cohabitation also covered by the
purports to marry language. Why not separate out actual bigamy from a
combined target of actual polygamy and religious cohabitation, all of which
the Brown court saw as religiously motivated? The reason is fairly obvious:
either the Brown court would have to find that Reynolds controlled and the
statute did not violate the Free Exercise Clause, or it would have to strike down
Reynolds.270 The latter would have allowed for the possibility of legal
recognition of religiously motivated polygamous marriages in Utah.
Furthermore, there is no justification given by the Brown court for its
refusal to undertake the operational neutrality analysis of the bigamy statute as
a whole, in which all the possible targets of both the purports to marry and
cohabitation language would be evaluated together, as had the courts in Green
and Holm. When this is done, actual prosecutions of both religious and
nonreligiously motivated conduct can be shown.
Hialeah itself can offer no justification for the approach taken in Brown.
In Hialeah, the Supreme Court was faced with four separate ordinances271 that
it first evaluated individually,272 finding that three of them operated to create a
“religious gerrymander.”273 It was necessary to look at both the exemptions
and prohibitions within each ordinance to evaluate its neutrality. The lack of
operational neutrality for each of these three was revealed by exemptions
269

This is not the case, however, as I argue below. See infra Parts II.A.5.b–c.
The court made it more than clear that it thought that Reynolds should in fact be struck down, but
backed away from doing so. Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1188–89, 1204 n.49.
271 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 526–28 (1993) (discussing
Ordinance 87-40, incorporating Florida’s animal cruelty laws; Ordinance 87-52, defining sacrifice as
unnecessary killing of an animal in a ritual not primarily for food consumption; Ordinance 87-71, making it
unlawful to sacrifice animals in City of Hialeah; and Ordinance 87-72, defining slaughter and prohibiting it
outside areas not zoned for this purpose).
272 Id. at 535–40.
273 Id. at 535 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
270
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within each ordinance that left Santeria animal sacrifice the sole possible target
of each.274 This does not justify the Brown court’s approach of splitting up a
single statute into three targets and then evaluating two together and one
separately for operational neutrality. In addition, the fourth ordinance, on its
own, appeared to apply to nonreligious conduct,275 but the Court determined
that “the four substantive ordinances may be treated as a group for neutrality
purposes” because the neutral one was enacted on the same day and in
response to the same event, the opening of a Santeria Church, as the other
three.276 If anything, the eventual treatment by the Court of the four ordinances
as if they were one suggests that a single statute should at least be seen as a
totality. Indeed, actual bigamy, actual polygamy, and religious cohabitation
(marital forms 1, 2, 3, and 4 above) have been a combined target of single
statutes since the 1887 Edmunds Act.277
b. Cohabitation is Cohabitation
To find that the statute was not operationally neutral in its targeting of
religious cohabitation, the Brown court needed to show that while religious
cohabitation is prohibited by the statute, “secular”278 cohabitation is not so
prohibited. It did this by identifying secular cohabitation with adulterous
cohabitation. Adulterous cohabitation consists of persons “outside the
community of those who practice polygamy for religious reasons”279 who live
together when at least one of them is legally married to a third party. It is
cohabitation by virtue of the fact that they “live together ‘as if’ they are
married in the sense that they share a household and a sexually intimate
relationship.”280 The court noted that while adulterous cohabitation also falls
within the separate crime of adultery,281 it has not been prosecuted as a crime
under that statute since 1928 and has never been prosecuted as polygamous
cohabitation under the bigamy statute.282 Of course, the latter is because both
274

Id. at 537 (“A pattern of exemptions parallels the pattern of narrow prohibitions.”).
Id. at 539–40.
276 Id. at 540.
277 See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
278 See Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 542 (“[T]he texts of the ordinances were gerrymandered with care to
proscribe religious killings of animals but to exclude almost all secular killings . . . .”).
279 Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1210 (D. Utah 2013) (quoting State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726,
772 (Utah 2006) (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
280 Id. (quoting Holm, 137 P.3d at 771–72 (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
281 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-103(1) (West 2004) (“A married person commits adultery when he
voluntarily has sexual intercourse with a person other than his spouse.”).
282 Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1210.
275

STRASSBERG GALLEYSPROOFS2

1856

5/27/2015 2:06 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1815

federal and Utah state courts had consistently interpreted the word cohabitation
in a polygamy statute as a reference to something other than mere adulterous
cohabitation.283 The exclusion of adulterous cohabitation from the Utah
bigamy statute led the Brown court to conclude that, in the language of
Hialeah, “few if any [cohabitations] are prohibited other than [religious
cohabitations].”284 Thus, the Brown court concluded that the bigamy statute
was not operationally neutral because it targeted only religious cohabitation
and not nonreligiously motivated or secular cohabitation, such as adultery.
The problem with this conclusion is that the real distinction consistently
made by courts construing this word, as used in a criminal polygamy law since
Cannon, has been between marital cohabitation, which was the target of the
polygamy laws, and mere sexual cohabitation, which was the target of adultery
and fornication laws. Indeed, the Cannon Court had found that proof of a
sexual relationship was not necessary to prove the public offense of living and
presenting oneself as married. Under the current Utah bigamy statute, the
“indicia” of marital cohabitation are likely to be the same elements required by
Utah’s “common law” marriage statute.285 Although in a bigamy or polygamy
situation, one of the common law marriage elements—legal capacity to enter
into a marriage—will never be present; all the remaining elements—the
capacity to contract; the existence of a consensual contract; cohabitation; the
assumption of marital duties, rights, and obligations; and a uniform reputation
as married or as husband and wife286—can be present. The fact that
cohabitation itself is just one of several essential factors that must be shown to
find “marriage”287 suggests that the word cohabitation in the common law
marriage statute is meant narrowly288 as “sexual cohabitation,” meaning
283

See supra note 279.
Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1210 (alterations in original) (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 536 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
285 UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (West 2014) (addressing validity of marriage not solemnized).
286 Id.
287 Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791, 795 (Utah 1994) (holding that evidence of reputation, cohabitation, and
assumptions of marital obligations were insufficient without evidence of consent, which could be shown by a
written agreement; witness evidence of an oral agreement; joint banking or joint credit accounts; joint
ownership of property; use of a man’s name by a woman, children, or both of the relationship; filing joint tax
returns; stating they are married in formal documents, such as deeds and wills; and telling third parties they are
married).
288 See Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 671–72 (Utah 1985) (noting that “the term ‘cohabitation’ does
not lend itself to a universal definition that is applicable in all settings” and that “[t]o some extent, the meaning
of the term depends upon the context in which it is used,” and interpreting a divorce decree requiring payment
of half the equity in the marital home if the ex-wife “cohabit[ed]” to require “common residency and sexual
contact”).
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“common residency[,] . . . sharing of a common abode that both parties
consider their principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of
time” and “sexual conduct[, which] means participation in a relatively
permanent sexual relationship akin to that generally existing between husband
and wife.”289
In contrast, when the court in Green found that cohabitation under the
bigamy statute had occurred, it carefully mentioned facts that covered all of the
five relevant elements of common law marriage. Common residency was
established by the fact that Green and the women “shared a group of mobile
homes.”290 Permanent sexual relationship was shown by the fact that “Green
spent nights with each woman on a rotating schedule.”291 A consensual
contract was found by the fact that both the women and their children adopted
the Green surname.292 Assumption of marital duties, rights, and obligations
was also shown to be present: “Together, Green and the women undertook
spousal and parental obligations.”293 Facts mentioned in Green showing
uniform reputation as married or as husband and wife included Green
“refer[ring] to each of these woman as a wife . . . . [and] [t]he woman likewise
considered themselves Green’s wives,”294 and the fact that “[b]etween 1988
and 2001, Green appeared on various television shows with the women,
consistently referring to the women as his wives, and the women likewise
acknowledged spousal relationships.”295 Thus, the Green decision can be
understood to define cohabitation in the bigamy statute as marital cohabitation,
which includes sexual cohabitation but requires considerable additional proof.
None of the indicia mentioned by the Green court included either the
religious ceremonies Green and his wives had participated in or the religious
motivation for their unlicensed marriages. The Brown court found these
omissions to be misleading because “the most important factor of such plural
cohabitations in Utah” is “their religious nature.”296 However, the question is
not whether the religious nature of polygamous cohabitations in Utah is
289 Id. at 672; see also Richards v. Brown, 274 P.3d 911, 913–14 (Utah 2012) (describing the trial court’s
finding that cohabitation ceased no later than when one party moved out of the shared home, implying that it
could have occurred four years earlier when, after six years together, the parties ceased sexual relations).
290 State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 832 (Utah 2004).
291 Id. at 831.
292 Id. at 831–32.
293 Id. at 832.
294 Id. at 831.
295 Id. at 823.
296 Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1211 (D. Utah 2013).
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important to the participants, but rather whether this is important to the State. I
would argue that the crucial feature of these cohabitations is that they are
marital rather than merely sexual in nature. Once it is understood that the target
of the statute is marital cohabitation, the question under Hialeah becomes
whether the statute targets only religious marital cohabitation or whether it also
targets secular marital cohabitation, thereby showing that the religious or
secular quality of the marital cohabitation is irrelevant.
The Utah common law marriage statute described above sets out the
features of a secular marital cohabitation. For example, the Holm court cited
the Utah case Whyte v. Blair297 to demonstrate how “cohabitation alone”298
(meaning marital cohabitation without a marriage ceremony rather than sexual
cohabitation alone) can produce a “marital relationship”299 that could be
viewed as marriage under the common law statute. Whyte had sought to have a
court recognize the relationship he had with a woman he was living with as a
common law marriage so that he could be considered a “family member[]”
under her insurance policy.300 The facts showed an unlicensed,
unsolemnized301 relationship that did not seem to involve religious
cohabitation. Such “marital relationships” or “marriages” can come to exist
without a religious or secular solemnization ceremony, as may have been the
case in Whyte itself. However, in the absence of such a ceremony, Whyte
emphasized the importance of establishing the element of consent to marry in
other ways,302 providing a nonexhaustive list of what other evidence might
show consent. This ranged from a written agreement or evidence showing an
oral agreement to enter into a marital relationship to
maintenance of joint banking and credit accounts; purchase and joint
ownership of property; the use of the man’s surname by the woman
and/or the children of the union; the filing of joint tax returns;
speaking of each other in the presence of third parties as being
married; and declaring the relationship in documents executed by
them while living together, such as deeds, wills, and other formal
instruments.303

297
298
299
300
301
302
303

885 P.2d 791 (Utah 1994).
State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 735 (Utah 2006).
Id. (quoting Whyte, 885 P.2d at 793).
Whyte, 885 P.2d at 792.
Id.
Id. at 795.
Id.
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The emphasis on showing consent to marry reflects the statute’s requirement
that the marriage “arise[] out of a contract.”304 Evidence of such a contract is
necessary to establish that the parties intended to create a relationship binding
on the parties even after they no longer desire it to exist and to show that they
intended to enjoy the benefits and take on the obligations that civil law
provides for marriage. An unlicensed religious solemnization would satisfy the
requirement for consent to marry under the common law marriage statute
because, whatever its religious significance, the language of such ceremonies
is also the language of contract. But this is hardly the only way to make such a
contract. Creation of an express civil contract without the involvement of
religion or other conduct that evidences the creation of such a contract, as
described above, will suffice. Thus, in Green, it was possible to show the
existence of marital relationships without reference to the religious ceremonies
that had in fact occurred. Indeed, in Green, one of these marital relationships
was judicially declared to be a legally recognized common law marriage,305
thus making the other marital relationships unlawful cohabitation under the
bigamy statute.
We can see that both religious marital relationships and nonreligious
marital relationships can be found to be common law marriages under the Utah
common law marriage statute. However, it must also be the case that secular
cohabitation while legally married to another would produce a conviction
under the cohabitation language of the Utah bigamy statute. Although no such
actual prosecution or conviction can be shown in Utah, there is no reason to
believe that the law would not apply to a proper case. Suppose a polygamist
who had legally married both his first and second wives in his country of
origin were to immigrate to the United States with his second wife and settle in
Utah. Let us assume that this polygamous marriage was not based on any
religious mandate, but rather was simply a culturally accepted marital
practice.306 Concealing his first marriage from immigration authorities, he
presented his second wife as his legal wife and engaged in conduct that would
satisfy the common law marriage statute, except for the fact that he would not
have capacity to be married to the second wife because Utah would legally
304

UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5(1) (West 2014).
State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 833–34 (Utah 2004) (finding the State’s use of the common law or
“unsolemnized marriage statute” to establish Green’s legal marriage to one woman while cohabiting with four
others as appropriate).
306 See Penelope E. Andrews, “Big Love”? The Recognition of Customary Marriages in South Africa,
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1483, 1493–95 (2007) (describing South Africa’s Recognition of Customary
Marriages Act, which recognizes polygamous marriages performed according to indigenous law).
305

STRASSBERG GALLEYSPROOFS2

1860

5/27/2015 2:06 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1815

recognize the first marriage as prior. If Utah officials were to learn about the
existence of the first wife, they could prosecute this polygamist under the
cohabitation prong of the bigamy statute. The cohabitation prong of the Utah
statute is therefore operationally neutral because the cohabitation that is
sufficient to “show all the indicia of marriage” is not limited to cohabitation
undertaken subsequent to a religious marriage ceremony. The fact that most
known polygamists in Utah are Mormon Fundamentalists, and the State has
not had an opportunity to prosecute a nonreligiously motivated polygamist
under the cohabitation language, is simply an accident of Utah’s history and
current population. As Utah becomes more diverse,307 this may change, but it
need not do so for the bigamy statute to be understood as operationally neutral.
c. Purports to Marry
The Brown court also found that the purports to marry language in the Utah
bigamy statute, insofar as it referred to unlicensed, solemnized marriages
rather than licensed, solemnized marriages, also targeted only religious
marriage.308 In particular, the Brown court found this to be established by the
discussion in Holm of the importance of the religious solemnization ceremony
to the determination that Holm had purported to marry an additional wife.309
When the Holm court subsequently held “that Holm’s behavior is within the
ambit of our bigamy statute’s ‘purports to marry’ prong,”310 from this the
Brown court concluded that “it is the intention of the individuals to be
religiously married . . . that, for the Holm majority, constituted a key
consideration in whether the Statute had been violated.”311
However, before the Holm court concluded that the purport to marry
language had been violated, it indicated that “Holm and Stubbs [had both]
formed a marital bond and commenced a marital relationship.”312 The Holm
court described the religious ceremony as “the steps . . . by which two

307 It is estimated that there are currently “at least 15,000 African refugees in Utah.” Elaine Jarvik,
Africans Pull Together in Utah, 8,000 Miles from Homeland, DESERET NEWS (Aug. 8, 2010, 8:18 PM MDT),
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700054903/Africans-pull-together-in-Utah-8000-miles-fromhomeland.htm.
308 Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1226–34 (D. Utah 2013) (holding that the only
constitutional application of the purports to marry language is to criminalize multiple attempted legal
marriages).
309 State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 737 (Utah 2006).
310 Id.
311 Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1212.
312 Holm, 137 P.3d at 737.
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individuals commit themselves to undertake a marital relationship.”313 Indeed,
from the perspective of the state, what is important about such religious
ceremonies is simply that they also create a civil marital contract. It is for this
reason that religious solemnizations are permitted, with a license, to act as the
solemnization for legally recognized civil marriages. It is not the religious
character of religious solemnization that has legal significance or effect. If it
were, laws allowing religious solemnization to substitute for secular
solemnization would themselves violate the Establishment Clause. Thus, it was
precisely not the religious nature of the religious solemnization ceremony in
Holm that created the marital bond.
Furthermore, there is no reason why polygamous marriages could not arise
out of purporting to marry through unlicensed secular solemnization
ceremonies. It just happens to be the case that unlicensed solemnization
ceremonies are most often religious in nature. This is because, as we
understand the marital bond, it must be binding upon the parties who enter into
it. This requires the involvement of a power greater than the parties
themselves. The only two possibilities for such a power are the state314 and
God. In the absence of a license, the state officers who are empowered to
conduct secular solemnization ceremonies are not likely to be willing to do so.
Thus, there may have been no opportunity for the State of Utah to prosecute a
polygamy case involving a second secularly solemnized but unlicensed
marriage. However, one could imagine the possibility of a corrupt state official
who might choose for monetary or other reasons to pretend to legally marry a
couple in the absence of a license. In contrast, there are religious leaders who
are actually willing to conduct a religious solemnization ceremony without a
license.315 Prior to the legal recognition of same-sex marriage, many same-sex
couples participated in religious solemnization ceremonies. Widows and
widowers on social security have sometimes avoided the reduction in benefits
a legal marriage would produce by participating in a religious solemnization
ceremony without getting a marriage license.316 Thus, as a practical matter,
religious solemnization ceremonies are the usual route taken by those who seek
313

Id.
In marital cohabitation, the bond is created by “consent” to what amounts to a marital contract, which
the state will enforce if the parties have the capacity to marry through the common law marriage statute. See
supra notes 302–05 and accompanying text.
315 See Holm, 137 P.2d at 736 (describing Warren Jeffs, an official of the FLDS Church, who conducted
the ceremony and strangely included in the vows that each was to become the “lawful and wedded” spouse of
the other).
316 I know of one such case from my own personal knowledge.
314
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to create a bond that justifies them in entering into an actual, real-world marital
relationship in the absence of being able to or wanting to obtain a license.
However, just because virtually all cases of unlicensed solemnization involve
religious solemnization does not mean that the bigamy statute is operationally
non-neutral. The prohibition on purporting to marry someone while legally
married to another would apply to an unlicensed marriage solemnized by
secular officials. Indeed, Utah has a law that makes it a crime to knowingly
solemnize a marriage prohibited by law, with or without a license.317 It applies
to both the secular officials and the religious leaders who are authorized by law
to solemnize marriages, but practically speaking will rarely if ever be violated
by secular officials. It is not discrimination by the state if only the religious
choose to violate a law that both religious and nonreligious people can violate.
Finally, the requirement that, in addition to this moment of binding
commitment, the parties must actually establish by their conduct a marital
relationship in order to purport to marry,318 shows again that it is not the
religious implications of even a religious ceremony that are legally significant.
For example, imagine that two people engage in a religious ceremony that
from the perspective of their religion resulted in what the religion called a
marriage, but it was only to be acted on after the death of both. Then, imagine
that the two people then immediately go their separate ways and engage in no
conduct (including consummation) during their lifetime that is typical of
married couples. In such a case, we could say that something of only religious
significance had occurred and a merely religious marriage had been created,
which the law cannot seek to regulate. What the law can regulate is the
nonreligious aspect of marriage, in which the conduct of the parties toward
each other and toward those outside of the marriage is affected. As the
Supreme Court said in Reynolds, marriage may be “a sacred obligation,” but it
is also a “civil contract” out of which “spring social relations and social
obligations and duties, with which government is necessarily required to
deal.”319 It was for this reason that the Holm court considered the subsequent
cohabitation (in the narrow sense) of Holm and Stubbs—they lived in a house
together and “‘regularly’ engaged in sexual intercourse”320—in addition to the
ceremony to establish that they purported to marry. This ensured that that their
religious marriage ceremony was meant to be followed by the actual creation
317
318
319
320

UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-15(2) (West 2014).
Holm, 137 P.2d at 737.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1879).
Holm, 137 P.3d at 731.
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of a relationship and life together that would be identical to a legal marriage.
Thus, Holm establishes that in order for someone to violate the bigamy statute
by purporting to marry another, it is necessary to insure that the religious
ceremony is meant to have an impact in the secular world. It is this intention
rather than the religious intention that the statute seeks to reach. This is
consistent with what the Court in Reynolds described as the “rightful purposes
of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into
overt acts.”321
Thus, the application of the purports to marry language to unlicensed
religiously solemnized marriages is not operationally non-neutral for three
reasons. First, it is the civil contract created by saying “I do” in a religious
marriage ceremony that is viewed as creating the crucial marital bond. Second,
unlicensed secular solemnizations that created a marital bond would be equally
problematic under the statute. Third, it is the intention to engage in marital
conduct in the real world that is the true target of the purport to marry
language. The presence or absence of religious meaning to either the ceremony
or the subsequent marital conduct is of no significance to the statute.
d. Selective and Minimal Prosecution
The Brown court made one additional argument for the bigamy statute’s
operational non-neutrality, based on “the State’s explicit ‘policy of selective
prosecution.’”322 As applied to religiously motivated polygamy, the Utah
bigamy statute prohibits all such marriages and marital cohabitations. The
State of Utah simultaneously reserves the right to prosecute any conduct that
falls within the statute but has for the most part chosen to only prosecute
religiously motivated polygamy if a marriage with a girl under eighteen years

321

Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 163.
Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1216 (D. Utah 2013) (quoting Holm, 137 P.3d at 775
(Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
322
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of age has occurred.323 Holm was an example of this kind of prosecution.324
Green might also be seen as an example of this, as Green had originally
married one of his wives as a thirteen-year-old, even though all his wives were
of age for the period he was charged with bigamy.325 On the other hand, the
Brown court viewed Green’s prosecution as motivated by his open discussion
of his polygamy in the media.326 The threatened prosecution of Brown
illustrated both possibilities. Brown made his family the subject of a
nationwide reality television show, thus motivating a prosecutor to consider
charging him. However, none of Brown’s wives were underage at the time of
marriage and the prosecutor dropped the investigation of Brown while the
constitutional challenge was pending. In conjunction with dropping the case,
the prosecutor swore that he would not prosecute bigamy unless it occurred “in
the conjunction with another crime or a person under the age of [eighteen] was
a party.”327 It was not clear whether this decision was motivated by the policy
of limited prosecution or whether it was an attempt to moot the constitutional
challenge. But the prosecutor also said that another prosecutor who did not
adhere to the under-eighteen policy could seek charges against Brown under
the statute.328 Finally, the Brown court suggested that reserving the right to
prosecute bigamy alone really allowed the state to address other crimes
associated with polygamy, such as child abuse and domestic violence, which
are hard to obtain evidence of in the isolated and closed polygamous
communities without having evidence of those crimes.329 The result, the Brown
court argued was “apparently limitless prosecutorial discretion by individual

323 Id. at 1215–16. There is no question that Utah has some ambivalence about its bigamy law as it applies
to polygamy. In 1953, Arizona attempted to enforce its previous bigamy law by a mass arrest of polygamists in
the community of Short Creek. The men and women were arrested, and children were taken into state custody.
The result was a public relations nightmare for the state and weakened the appetite of the state to confront
religious polygamists using its criminal law. See Neil J. Young, Short Creek’s Long Legacy, SLATE (Apr. 16,
2008, 1:15 P.M.), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/faithbased/2008/04/short_creeks_long_legacy.html
(describing the public backlash to the raid).
Changing sexual mores and attitudes toward the role of the criminal law regarding premarital sex,
divorce, and adultery also weakened moral condemnations of polygamy, and the Supreme Court’s decision in
Lawrence v. Texas holding criminalization of homosexuality unconstitutional undermined moral justifications
for the criminalization of polygamy.
324 Holm, 137 P.3d at 730.
325 State v. Green, 108 P.3d 710, 713 (Utah 2005).
326 Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1216.
327 Id. at 1179.
328 Id.
329 Id. at 1216.
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State officials . . . to decide whether and when (and against whom) to enforce
the cohabitation prong of the Statute.”330
The Brown court concluded that this limitless prosecutorial discretion
regarding religious cohabitation under the bigamy statute is “fatal to any claim
to general applicability”331 under Hialeah. However, we have already seen that
the bigamy statute is generally applicable to both the religious and
nonreligious. Furthermore, the more limited enforcement of the law against
specifically religious polygamists shows the opposite of religious targeting. If
anything, the state, through this policy, eases the burden of the criminal law on
religiously motivated conduct. Indeed, in Geer, the nonreligious defendant
charged with attempted multiple legal marriages claimed that the state
selectively prosecuted only nonreligious bigamists.332 The nature of the
selective prosecution in this case simply fails to show that the government is
“in a selective manner impos[ing] burdens only on conduct motivated by
religious belief.”333 Thus, the strict scrutiny the Brown court applied to the
Utah bigamy statute is unjustified.
There may also be other explanations for the selective prosecution that has
occurred that are not constitutionally suspect. As we saw in Part I above, it has
not been easy for courts to articulate and justify their position that polygamy is
an offense against society. The harms described above range from very
specific impacts on individuals in polygamous families to the broad social
impacts of a pool of low status unmarried men, discrimination against women,
and an excess of resources devoted to acquiring wives. These harms may even
include an impact on the potential for democratic governance. Avoiding these
broad impacts of polygamy can be seen as protecting important foundations
upon which our society rests. Such foundational interests are not interests that
the state typically takes a conscious part in furthering. Thus, the State of Utah
may not fully understand the importance of its commitment to monogamy.334
The state may also have limited its prosecution out of a concern that the
criminalization of polygamy might be found unconstitutional. Since Lawrence,
it has not been clear that the moral objections that may have once been thought
330

Id. at 1217.
Id. at 1216.
332 State v. Geer, 765 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
333 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543 (1993).
334 Indeed, as shown in the discussion of the compelling state interests established in Green and found
inadequate by Brown, see supra Parts I.A.3–6, Utah has never identified any such foundational interest in
monogamy versus polygamy.
331

STRASSBERG GALLEYSPROOFS2

1866

5/27/2015 2:06 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1815

to justify criminalizing polygamy would suffice. This would explain why the
state only enforces the law when other “associated” crimes are present and
then relies on crimes associated with polygamy to justify the criminalization of
polygamy alone. However, if, as I argue here should be the case, Utah’s
criminalization of polygamy in all its forms can be confirmed to be
constitutional, the state may be empowered to step up its prosecutorial efforts.
There is also another important reason why the state has minimally
enforced the law. Because polygamy in Utah involves childbearing so
importantly, prosecuting fathers and mothers for entering into polygamous
marriages means taking parents away from their children. Utah closely
observed the extreme negatives of prosecution that came from Arizona’s 1953
raid of the polygamous town of Short Creek, on the border between Utah and
Arizona, resulting in putting 236 children into state custody.335 There are
innocent victims of polygamy who can be greatly harmed by prosecution. This
individual suffering is immediate and is therefore easily recognized by
prosecutors in a way that the foundational harms of polygamy are not. Thus,
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion with regard polygamists may reflect an
attempt to weigh the harm of prosecution to the children of polygamy against
the harm to the children of polygamy itself. This also explains the state’s
particular willingness to prosecute polygamy when harm to the children is
already clearly present.
In light of all these factors, it is not surprising that prosecutors are
ambivalent at best about actually enforcing the bigamy statute against
polygamists. The failure of the state to both fully recognize what the primary
compelling state and national interest is in criminalizing polygamy and
prioritize prosecution as a way to advance that interest does not mean either
that these interests do not exist or that statutory criminalization of polygamy
itself does not serve an important deterrent purpose.336 It was ultimately
sufficient to convince the Mormon Church to repudiate polygamy as a
religious practice, and it has been sufficient to largely restrain any natural
tendencies we may have towards polygamy or at least reshape them into what
we hope are less socially harmful practices, such as divorce and remarriage.337
335

See BENNION, supra note 96, at 27; see also Young, supra note 323.
Accord Reference, 2011 BCSC 1588, paras. 1337–1338 (Can.) (emphasizing the deterrent effect of the
law on those who take the rule of law seriously and rejecting arguments against the law based on the
“miniscule number of prosecutions over the provision’s 120 year history”).
337 Divorce is certainly recognized as harmful to children and women, but it does not have the broader
harmful social effects of polygamy described above.
336
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B. Heightened Scrutiny Under Smith’s Hybrid Rights Analysis
The Brown court also applied heightened scrutiny to the Utah bigamy
statute under the hybrid rights approach set out in Employment Division v.
Smith.338 In Smith, the Supreme Court held that, despite the substantial burden
placed on religious practices of Native Americans by a law making use of
peyote a crime, the law would only be subjected to rational basis scrutiny
because it was generally applicable.339 To reconcile the result in Smith with
such previous free exercise cases as Wisconsin v. Yoder, in which a generally
applicable state high school attendance law was given strict scrutiny as applied
to the Amish,340 Justice Scalia set out an alternative approach for generally
applicable laws that burden both religious practice and another fundamental
right.341 In Yoder, parental rights regarding the raising of children were also
burdened.342 In such “hybrid rights” cases, heightened scrutiny would be
justified.343 The Court in Smith did not indicate what kind of showing was
required with regard to the additional fundamental right burdened. Would the
scrutiny sought have to be separately and fully justified by the additional
burden or would a burden insufficient to justify strict scrutiny on its own be
combined with a free exercise burden similarly insufficient on its own to
produce a burden justifying heightened scrutiny? Clearly there are problems
with both approaches, as Justice Souter pointed out in his Hialeah
concurrence: if what hybrid analysis requires is the former, then the Free
Exercise analysis becomes irrelevant, and if it merely requires that latter, then
“the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith
rule.”344
The Brown court followed the Tenth Circuit’s determination that the hybrid
rights analysis “at least requires a colorable showing of infringement of
recognized and specific constitutional rights.”345 Under this standard, the
Brown court found that there were five additional fundamental rights
sufficiently burdened by the bigamy law as applied to religious polygamy to
justify heightened scrutiny: freedom of association, freedom of speech, and the
338

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 879–81.
340 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
341 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82.
342 406 U.S. at 209.
343 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
344 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993) (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
345 Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I–L, 135 F.3d. 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998).
339
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rights protected by the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clauses
including substantive due process rights.346 However, there was no analysis
whatsoever in the opinion of Brown’s freedom of association, equal protection,
free speech, or Establishment Clause claims to show that these were
“colorable” claims. This seems largely to be due to the fact that when the case
was decided upon summary judgment, the State failed to respond to the
detailed arguments on these constitutional claims made by the plaintiffs in their
motion for summary judgment.347 Thus, when the Brown court turned to the
hybrid analysis, it seemed to rely on the unopposed status of these claims to
conclude that they were at least “colorable.”348 Given that “[s]ound judicial
decisionmaking requires ‘both a vigorous prosecution and a vigorous defense’
of the issues in dispute,”349 it is difficult to give the Brown court’s conclusory
justification of heightened scrutiny much weight.
Furthermore, it is difficult to reconcile this conclusion with the Brown
court’s recognition that Reynolds is at least controlling as to the government’s
ability to criminalize attempts to enter into legally recognized polygamous
marriages. All five of the fundamental rights claimed to be infringed by
criminalizing multiple religious marriages or cohabitation could also be
claimed to justify heightened scrutiny of the prohibition of legal recognition of
religiously motivated polygamous marriages. Yet, in the very section of Smith
in which the hybrid analysis was first set out, Reynolds was cited by Justice
Scalia as a case that did not implicate the hybrid analysis: “There being no
contention that Oregon’s drug law represents an attempt to regulate religious
beliefs, the communication of religious beliefs, or the raising of one’s children
in those beliefs, the rule to which we have adhered ever since Reynolds plainly
controls.”350
As to the one constitutional claim that was fully argued, the substantive due
process claim, the Brown court concluded that no fundamental right justifying

346

Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1222 (D. Utah 2013).
Id. at 1176–77 (“The court was intrigued by the sheer lack of response in Defendant’s filing to
Plaintiffs’ seven detailed constitutional claims.”).
348 Id. at 1222 (“The court finds that each of Plaintiff’s companion constitutional claims . . . each largely
or entirely unopposed by Defendant (with the exception of the Substantive Due Process claim)—makes a
‘colorable showing’ . . . .”).
349 Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 572 (Souter, J. concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (quoting
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419 (1978)).
350 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
347
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heightened scrutiny could be shown under Washington v. Glucksberg.351 It
then went on to find that, under Tenth Circuit precedent,352 the sexual privacy
rights recognized in Lawrence v. Texas, and possibly implicated by religious
cohabitation, did not require more than rational basis review.353 Using this
finding of minimal substantive due process rational basis review to ratchet up
the free exercise analysis to heightened scrutiny demonstrates the potentially
universal application of the hybrid analysis in any case involving a religious
burden. Every criminal statute, if not every statute of any kind, can claim to be
a violation of the substantive due process right to be free of arbitrary and
irrational infringements on liberty and therefore be entitled to rational basis
scrutiny. If this, plus a religious burden, is enough to trigger heightened
scrutiny under the hybrid analysis, the effect is to almost return to the preSmith approach to free exercise claims, with the only change being heightened
rather than strict scrutiny.
Finally, the Brown court went on to cursorily conclude that the Utah
bigamy statute as applied to religious polygamy could not withstand
heightened scrutiny based on its previous determination that the statute could
not survive the strict scrutiny justified by its Hialeah operative non-neutrality
holding.354 It cannot be the case that failure to survive strict scrutiny will
necessarily result in failure to survive heightened scrutiny. Brown simply did
not consider the nature of heightened scrutiny as compared to strict scrutiny or
how such differences might impact the previous strict scrutiny analysis.
III. CRIMINALIZATION OF POLYGAMY CAN SURVIVE STRICT SCRUTINY
I have thus far presented an account of the harms of polygamy that should
be sufficient to establish a compelling state interest in criminalizing polygamy.
I have also argued that neither strict scrutiny nor heightened scrutiny of the
Utah bigamy statute is actually justified. However, should strict scrutiny be
justified, there are two remaining arguments that have not yet been considered.

351 Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1197; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding
that there was no substantive due process right to assisted suicide but establishing the standards required to
demonstrate such a right).
352 Seegmiller v. Laverkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 770–71(10th Cir. 2008) (finding that a police officer could
be punished for having sexual relations during an out-of-town training conference with another police officer
because there was no fundamental right to sexual privacy requiring heightened scrutiny).
353 Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1202.
354 Id. at 1222.

STRASSBERG GALLEYSPROOFS2

1870

5/27/2015 2:06 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1815

A. Would the Utah Bigamy Statute Be Viewed as Narrowly Tailored?
The Brown court argued that, in its application to unlicensed religious
marriages and religious cohabitation, the statute is not narrowly tailored to
advance even a compelling state interest.355 The Brown court essentially
claimed that the statute is both overinclusive and underinclusive in relation to
the ends it seeks to advance. It is overinclusive because “in the absence of any
claim of legal marriage, neither participation in a religious ceremony nor
cohabitation can plausibly be said to threaten marriage as a social or legal
institution.”356 It is underinclusive because the state fails to prosecute
adulterous cohabitation either under the bigamy statute or the adultery statute,
and there is “no rational basis to distinguish between [adulterous cohabitation
and religious cohabitation], not least with regard to the State interest in
protecting the institution of marriage.”357 The Brown court’s distinctions make
no more sense here than they did previously in the context of its operational
non-neutrality analysis.358 The marital cohabitation targeted by the bigamy
statute, including both religious and nonreligious cohabitation, is importantly
different from adulterous cohabitation. Not only do such marital relationships
implicate the same interests the state seeks to address and regulate in the
context of licensed monogamous marriage, such as the protection of children
born to the relationship, financial dependency, and joint property, but
polygamous cohabitation has broader social impacts that adultery does not
have, whether it is on the marriage prospects of others, the status of women
and children, or the resources available for social and individual advancement.
It is the real-world impact of polygamous marital cohabitation in these arenas
that the state is compellingly interested in,359 and there is little difference in its
interest, whether the relationship in question has been legally recognized or
not.360 In criminalizing all multiple marital relationships, whether or not they
claim legal status or are motivated by religion, the State addresses all the
conduct that creates such social problems. Thus, the statute is not overinclusive
in criminalizing polygamous cohabitation.

355

Id. at 1218.
Id. (quoting State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 772 (Utah 2006) (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
357 Id. at 1224.
358 See supra Part II.A.5.b.
359 Holm, 137 P.3d at 743 (“[D]ecisions made by individuals as to how to structure even the most personal
of relationships are capable of dramatically affecting public life.”).
360 Id. (“[T]he formation of relationships that are marital in nature is of great interest to this State, no
matter what the participants in or the observers of that relationship venture to name the union.”).
356
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The argument that the statute is underinclusive because it fails to target
adulterous cohabitation assumes that the same harms of polygamy arise out of
adulterous cohabitation as well: “Both scenarios . . . involve minors as the
children born to women involved in such relationships, involve public conduct,
and involve economic implications to [women] and children.”361 Because the
Brown court refused to acknowledge the possibility of nonreligious marital
cohabitation, it lumped all nonreligious cohabitation under the label
“adulterous” cohabitation. As result, for the Brown court, there is a type of
adulterous cohabitation that is marital in nature and will produce all the same
consequences and be of interest to the state in the same way. However, as
discussed above,362 this type of cohabitation will be captured under the
cohabitation prong of the bigamy statute. The nonmarital adulterous
cohabitation that is not prohibited by the bigamy statute is a different kind of
relationship all together. With the advent of easily attainable divorce,
adulterous cohabitation is not the only way to establish a new marital
relationship. Today, one can get divorced and remarried. Access to
contraceptives also means that adultery does not have to involve child bearing
as a result of its sexual component. Thus, choosing to stay married yet engage
in nonmarital adulterous cohabitation means that the relationship is more likely
to just be about sex and companionship. Individuals who intend to include
child bearing as part of their adulterous cohabitation are much more likely to
enter into a marital relationship, which would then subject them to the bigamy
law should they already be legally married to someone else. Thus, because the
bigamy law reaches all multiple relationships that are marital in nature, it is not
underinclusive.
If the bigamy law is neither over- nor underinclusive in its attempt to deter
the harmful effects of multiple simultaneous marital relationships, then it is
narrowly tailored to advance its ends. Indeed, if one accepts the harms to
women, men, children, and society itself that polygamy inevitably brings, it is
hard to imagine how a law criminalizing all forms of polygamy is not the only
way to avoid these harms.
B. Religious Polygamy Has Its Own Unique Harms
I have argued that, contrary to the holding of Brown, the Utah bigamy
statute should not be subject to strict or heightened scrutiny despite its impact
361
362

Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1223–24 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See supra Part II.A.5.b.
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on religious practice. Merely appreciating the harms of all polygamy in
contrast to the benefits of monogamy, whether the polygamy arises out of
multiple legally recognized marriages or multiple marital relationships created
by religious ceremonies, secular ceremonies, or contractual consent, allows us
to see both that it would make little sense for Utah to target only religiously
motivated polygamy and even less sense to read the Utah bigamy statute as if it
does so. Yet, I would also like to consider the possible strict scrutiny of the
statute as it was interpreted by the Brown court, as non-neutral and targeting
only religiously motivated polygamy. This requires finding a special harm
arising out of religiously motivated polygamy that is not present in cultural
polygamy.
It is a peculiar feature of the application of the polygamy law to Mormon
Fundamentalist polygamy that the very feature that is most protected, the
relationship of the practice to religious belief, may be what makes this
particular form of polygamy particularly pernicious. In Reference, the Attorney
General of British Columbia pointed out that there was something paradoxical
about the claim of religious liberty in that case:
This case may be unique in the section 2(a) jurisprudence in that,
because polygamy’s harms are most obvious where there is the
presence of an external, supposedly binding authority sanctioning it,
the religiosity of the practice itself exacerbates the harm. The
evidence that has emerged from expert and lay witnesses alike
indicates that, the greater the religious fervor with which polygamy is
intertwined, the more harmful it can expect to be. This is not so with
any other case asserting a religious right to do something
prohibited.363

To elaborate on the Attorney General’s point, the greatest deprivation of
individual rights arising from the practice of polygamy in the United States
today is almost exclusively a feature of certain Mormon Fundamentalist
polygamous communities.
Religion plays a crucial rule in the way this practice of polygamy is shaped.
These communities fully embrace polygamy as a mandatory religious practice
for both men and woman necessary to achieve eternal salvation.364 They also
363

Reference, 2011 BCSC 1588, para. 1081 (Can.).
See Maura Strassberg, The Crime of Polygamy, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 353, 382 (2003)
(noting that, according to Mormon fundamentalist religious doctrine, women who refuse to enter into
polygamy are damned to hell); see also Reference, 2011 BCSC 1588, para. 318 (observing that “plural
marriage is essential to personal and family salvation” for members of the FLDS fundamentalist sect).
364

STRASSBERG GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

5/27/2015 2:06 PM

SCRUTINIZING POLYGAMY

1873

accept the authority of a divinely chosen religious leader, a “Prophet,” over all
facets of life, including control over marriage partners.365 These religious
beliefs form the scaffolding of isolated communities in which religious
authorities have near total control of the familial, educational, social,
economic, and governmental environment and use this control to organize
community life to ensure that all within it conform to these religious beliefs.366
While religious power is buttressed by legal power, economic power, social
power, and physical power, these real power structures are in turn always
justified by the religious beliefs. It is this unique combination of religion and
power that turns a belief in the religious value of polygamy into an actual
practice of polygamy that can be extremely coercive.367
The coercive power of a community devoted to polygamy is further
enhanced when those required to enter into the practice are least able to
withstand such coercion. As discussed above, polygamy inevitably leads to
younger ages of marriage for women.368 Some of the communities that practice
religious polygamy target young teenage girls for entry into polygamous
marriages.369 There are religious as well as practical explanations for why
young women are targeted by religious polygamy. Religious doctrine
postulates both a religious imperative and a religious payoff for maximizing
reproduction by male adherents.370 Not only does this make participation in
polygamy of all female members of the community essential, but it also makes
bringing them into polygamous marriage at the earliest possible reproductive
age most effective for achieving these religious goals.

365 Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, SPLC, http://www.splcenter.org/getinformed/intelligence-files/groups/fundamentalist-church-of-jesus-christ-of-latter-day-saints
(last
visited
May 17, 2015) (describing the repressive rule of Prophet Warren Jeffs).
366 BONNIE L. PETERS, FAMILY SUPPORT CTR., THE PRIMER: A GUIDEBOOK FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
HUMAN SERVICES AGENCIES WHO OFFER ASSISTANCE TO FUNDAMENTALIST MORMON FAMILIES 18 (2011),
available at http://www.familysupportcenter.org/Primer.pdf (“It has been alleged that the FLDS church
controls the police force, city council, city government, and elected officials.”); id. at 19 (noting that a church
trust “owns most of the land, housing and businesses in the community”).
367 Accord Michah Gottlieb, Are We All Protestants Now?, JEWISH REV. BOOKS, Summer 2012, at 15, 17
(2012) (book review) (describing similar coercion in the context of ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities as a
result of “their poor command of English and lack of secular education” and noting the paradox “that while the
ultra-Orthodox justify their separatism by appealing to religious freedom, they use that freedom to restrict the
freedom of their individual members”).
368 See supra Part I.B.2.
369 Reference, 2011 BCSC 1588, paras. 330, 649, 653 (Can.).
370 See Strassberg, supra note 60, at 1579.
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Young teenage girls are also more easily pressured into such marriages
than they might be at age eighteen or older. They are still under the control of
their parents, and their age-related pliability is enhanced by familial, social,
and religious indoctrination that makes polygamous marriage the only possible
future they can both value and imagine. These two factors make young teenage
girls the perfect polygamous wives.
Finally, ensuring that these young women do not have the opportunity to
grow to adulthood and leave the community to marry, perhaps monogamously,
allows polygamy to be a self-sustaining practice over time. Male polygamists
cannot maximize their reproduction without a large pool of women to marry.
So long as the community continues to funnel all its female children into
polygamous reproduction, there is a possibility that the community can sustain
its polygamous practices over multiple generations without having to expand
the pool of potential wives through new recruits. So it is possible to see how
religious belief can and has shaped a particularly coercive practice of underage
polygamy.
However, this justification is complicated by the fact that some religiously
polygamous communities, such as the Apostolic United Brethren (AUP), have
backed away from both underage and arranged marriages,371 perhaps due to a
concern about prosecution or as a result of evolving attitudes and beliefs about
the autonomy of women, or some combination of the two. Furthermore, many
of these AUP community members are relatively integrated into mainstream
civil society, living in non-polygamous towns and cities and having their
children attend public school. This presents the possibility of a gentler form of
religious polygamy that may not be coercive. Yet, it is not clear whether this
gentler practice of religious polygamy is sustainable. As many as fifty percent
of children may leave this sect as adults, producing a shrinking pool of
potential polygamous wives.372 At some point in time, the religious need of
male members of the community to create expansive polygamous families
could trump these progressive steps and require restructuring of both
community life and the age of polygamous marriage to ensure capture of
female children within the community as polygamous wives. Thus, as long as
polygamy is a religious imperative, it may well force adherents to take steps to
371

PETERS, supra note 366, at 11–12.
Id. at 13. Contact with the non-polygamous world does, however, create the possibility of bringing
new women into the community and polygamous marriage. For example, Kody Brown’s first, third, and fourth
wives came from within the Apostolic United Brethren polygamous families, while his second wife was not
raised in a polygamous family. BENNION, supra note 96, at 183.
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minimize the autonomy of women so as to maximize their entry into
polygamous marriages. Thus, coercion and religious polygamy may well be
particularly inextricable. Furthermore, the extra coercion provided by religion
may be a key feature in the continued existence of polygamous communities.
The question which then arises is to what extent does free exercise
jurisprudence allow consideration of the way in which religious belief can be
combined with autonomy-denying and -destroying practices to render
individuals incapable of asserting or exercising their rights to avoid
participation in the religious practice? Certainly, many who criticize Yoder v.
Wisconsin373 today focus on the rights of adolescents to an education that will
make it possible for them to freely choose as adults whether to embrace the
Amish lifestyle or reject it.374 The issue of children’s rights is even more
starkly drawn in the context of religious polygamy. Here, the exchange is not
just an education for the romanticized agrarian life of the Amish375 but an
exchange of education and freedom to choose monogamous marriage, a
marriage partner and self-determination in matters of child-bearing for the very
difficult life of a polygamous wife with a long period of childbearing, primary
financial responsibility for a large family with little earning potential, and
largely single parenting. Indeed, Yoder itself has contributed to the problem by
allowing Mormon fundamentalist families to withdraw both boys and girls
from school by age thirteen or fourteen, thus making it particularly difficult to
provide these children with practical options to life within the community, let
alone the psychological and intellectual tools to decide for themselves about
polygamy. Reconsideration of Yoder in the context of religious polygamy will
not be necessary so long as all polygamy is seen as socially harmful and laws
criminalizing polygamy are understood as neutral and generally applicable,
even when the practical reality in a particular state may be that polygamy is
primarily chosen by those whose religion mandates it. However, should this
practical reality be taken as confining the target of polygamy laws to religious
polygamy, as Brown asserted, it may not be possible for the Court to avoid
confronting Yoder.
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406 U.S. 205 (1972).
See HAMILTON, supra note 53, at 64 (criticizing Yoder for making Amish children “martyr[s] to their
parents’ faith”); JEFFREY SHULMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARENT 200 (2014) (“[I]s not schooling beyond the
eighth grade a prerequisite for the information and self-confidence required for independent judgment?”).
375 HAMILTON, supra note 53, at 5–6 (describing Yoder as “a love letter to the Amish,” whom the Court
saw as upstanding citizens and parents, and noting how more recently the Amish have been shown to have
serious issues with alcoholism, violence, incest, and practices of shunning that punish rape victims).
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CONCLUSION
American jurisprudence has long struggled to articulate the harms of
polygamy, even as it has, until Brown, insisted that these harms were sufficient
to overcome the burden on religious practice created by criminalizing
polygamy. The apparent failure of the state interests thus far thought to be
implicated by polygamy to survive the strict scrutiny applied in Brown gave
some urgency to remedying this deficit. Reference provides this understanding
of the considerable inherent harms of polygamy, backed by the best empirical
data ever available on the social and individual impacts of polygamy. The
“cruel arithmetic” of polygamy cannot help but produce deep repercussions on
individuals, communities, and society in general. In light of this, it is difficult
to credit Brown’s claim that only animus against a minority religious practice
can explain the criminalization of unlicensed polygamous marriages and
marital relationships. It is an accident of history that one religion chose to
embrace as a fundamental practice a marital form antithetical to and
destructive of the very social fabric that allowed the religion to emerge. The
prohibition against polygamy is not about religion but about women and men
and children and the kind of society they can live in. Once this is recognized, it
is impossible to see the Utah bigamy statute as anything but a neutral and
generally applicable law that happens to be operating in a state with a great
disproportion of religious polygamists. Consequently, neither the strict scrutiny
nor the heightened scrutiny applied in Brown is justified. At the same time, it is
hard to imagine that the interests at stake in the choice between monogamy and
polygamy are not sufficient to survive strict scrutiny, even if it were to be
justified.

